An Unreasonable Ban on Reasonable Competition: The Legal Profession’s Protectionist Stance Against Noncompete Agreements Binding In-House Counsel by Horvitz, Kevin D.
HORVITZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016 8:55 PM 
 
Notes 
AN UNREASONABLE BAN ON REASONABLE 
COMPETITION: THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S 
PROTECTIONIST STANCE AGAINST 
NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS BINDING IN-
HOUSE COUNSEL  
KEVIN D. HORVITZ† 
ABSTRACT 
  In the vast majority of jurisdictions in the United States, a business 
may protect its confidential information and customer goodwill by 
conditioning employment on an employee’s acceptance of a covenant 
not to compete. These covenants are beneficial to the marketplace 
because they allow employers to provide employees with necessary 
skills, knowledge, and proprietary information without any fear of 
misappropriation. Accordingly, noncompete agreements are upheld 
by courts so long as they pass a fact-specific “reasonableness” test. 
  Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of reasonable 
noncompete agreements for all other professionals—including 
doctors and corporate executives—forty-eight states, following the 
American Bar Association’s lead, prohibit all noncompete agreements 
among lawyers. This prohibition is purportedly designed to protect 
both an attorney’s professional autonomy and a client’s right to 
choose his counsel. Despite legal commentators’ criticism of the 
prohibition, several state bar associations have recently extended it 
beyond the traditional law-firm context to agreements between 
companies and their in-house counsel. This expansion has 
transformed a questionable policy of professional self-regulation into 
an unjustifiable infringement on the legitimate interests of corporate 
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employers. In addition to providing an analysis of the history and 
ethical norms that justify rejection of the ban’s application to in-house 
counsel, this Note argues that bar committees that issue opinions 
supporting the ban’s extension may be susceptible to antitrust liability 
under the Supreme Court’s new Dental Board standard pertaining to 
state-action immunity.  
 
 
Our duty to regulate the legal profession is not for the purpose of 
creating a monopoly for lawyers, or for their economic 
protection . . . . 
 – Linder v. Insurance Claims Consultants1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since early English common law, it has been widely accepted 
that employers have a legitimate right to protect their confidential 
information, trade secrets, and customer goodwill from 
misappropriation.2 To protect this right, an employer may lawfully 
condition employment on an employee’s acceptance of a “covenant 
not to compete.”3 A “noncompete” agreement is valid and 
enforceable as long as the covenant is no “greater than necessary to 
protect the [employer’s] legitimate interests,” does not “impose[] an 
undue hardship on the employee,” and is not “injurious to the public 
interest.”4 Courts routinely apply this “reasonableness” test when 
considering the enforceability of noncompete agreements governing 
virtually every employee and professional in the United States, 
including doctors, dentists, veterinarians, corporate executives, and, 
until the 1960s, lawyers.5 
 
 1. Linder v. Ins. Claims Consultants, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 612, 617 (S.C. 2002). 
 2. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) (“The 
inhibition against restraints of trade at common law seems at first to have had no exception.”). 
 3. Throughout this Note, the commonly used terms “covenant not to compete,” 
“noncompete agreements,” “noncompete covenants,” “noncompetes,” “noncompetition 
agreements,” and “restrictive covenants” are used interchangeably without any substantive 
change in implied meaning. 
 4. E.g., Merrimack Valley Wood Prods. v. Near, 876 A.2d 757, 762 (N.H. 2005).  
 5. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 181–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(applying the reasonableness test to noncompete agreements involving corporate executives); 
Hicklin v. O’Brien, 138 N.E.2d 47, 52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) (lawyers); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 
A.2d 1161, 1166 (N.J. 1978) (doctors); Kaeser v. Adamson, No. CA-773, 1982 WL 5602, at *8 
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Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of reasonable 
noncompete agreements for other professionals, many within the 
legal community argue that noncompete agreements for attorneys 
should be held to a significantly different standard. This assertion 
dates back to a 1961 American Bar Association (ABA) Ethics 
Opinion, which held for the first time that all restrictive 
postemployment covenants for lawyers should be treated as per se 
unethical.6 The Opinion justified this special prohibition by explaining 
that “[t]he practice of law . . . is a profession, not a business,” 
“[c]lients are not merchandise,” “lawyers are not tradesmen,” and 
covenants are “an unwarranted restriction on the right of a lawyer to 
choose where he will practice and inconsistent with our professional 
status.”7 Over the last half century, the underlying justification has 
evolved, but the per se prohibition on attorney noncompetes has 
remained. Today, ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC, 
Model Rule, or Rule) 5.6 reflects that prohibition: 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: 
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other 
similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to 
practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement 
concerning benefits upon retirement . . . .8 
The official Comments to the Model Rule explain that the 
prohibition is designed to protect lawyers’ professional autonomy and 
assure clients’ freedom to choose a lawyer.9 Although the Model 
Rules are only guidelines, forty-eight states have adopted some 
 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1982) (veterinarians); Olson v. Hillsdale Dental, Ltd., 371 N.W.2d 429, 
429 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (unpublished disposition) (dentists). 
 6. Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal 
Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 488 (2008). 
 7. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961). 
 8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 9. Id. cmt. 1 (“An agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after leaving a 
firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose 
a lawyer.”). Recent ethics opinions emphasize that client autonomy is the primary rationale for 
the rule. See, e.g., Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 87-24 (1988) (“The purpose . . . 
is to ensure that clients may seek the legal advice of a lawyer of their choosing. Although law 
firms have a right to protect their legitimate business interests, including their client base, they 
may not do so to the exclusion of the client’s preference.”).  
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version of Rule 5.6 or its substantially similar predecessor, ABA 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-108.10 
Violation of these professional-conduct rules and opinions may 
be enforceable by professional sanctions, but they are not designed 
for court enforcement.11 Nevertheless, courts regularly rely on these 
pronouncements as persuasive authority and “in the case of lawyer 
noncompete covenants, [they] have relied almost completely on the 
ABA’s approach to the issue.”12 
The vast majority of opinions discussing and enforcing Rule 5.6’s 
per se ban have only considered the Rule as it applies to lawyers who 
leave a law firm in order to practice at another law firm.13 These 
opinions have been met with a litany of justifiable academic 
criticisms, which primarily assert that law firms invest substantial time 
and resources into training and developing attorneys and should 
therefore be allowed to protect these legitimate interests with 
reasonable noncompete agreements.14 Critics also point out that it is 
nonsensical to create a special exception for the legal profession 
based on public-policy objectives of safeguarding “client choice,” 
when we readily enforce reasonable noncompetes in the medical 
profession (and every other profession).15 Despite staunch academic 
criticism,16 these cries for reform have largely fallen on deaf ears. Only 
 
 10. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); see Linda 
Sorenson Ewald, Agreements Restricting the Practice of Law: A New Look at an Old Paradox, 
26 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 6 & n.11 (2002) (listing which states have adopted the rule). 
 11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) 
(“Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should 
it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached.”). 
 12. Barton, supra note 6, at 489. For an overview of the small minority of courts that has 
rejected the ABA’s approach, see infra Part II.C. 
 13. Barbara C. Bentrup, Note, Friend or Foe: Reasonable Noncompete Restrictions Can 
Benefit Corporate In-House Counsel and Protect Corporate Employers, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1037, 1037–38 (2008).  
 14. E.g., Wm. C. Turner Herbert, Comment, Let’s Be Reasonable: Rethinking the 
Prohibition Against Noncompete Clauses in Employment Contracts Between Attorneys in North 
Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 249, 266–67 (2003) (discussing law firms’ “interest in minimizing 
competition”). 
 15. Id. at 278 (“Nor does any substantive distinction between the medical and legal 
professions justify the latter's prohibition from the reasonable use of noncompetition 
agreements.”); Barton, supra note 6, at 490 (“The distinction between lawyers and other 
professionals is quite difficult to defend. . . . In fact, the choice of a doctor seems much more 
personal and much more likely to have serious and life-changing ramifications than the choice 
of a lawyer.”).  
 16. For an example of this criticism, see Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele Jr., 
Ethics and the Law of Contract Juxtaposed: A Jaundiced View of Professional Responsibility 
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two states—California and Arizona—have abandoned the per se 
prohibition.17 
Although the blanket prohibition on noncompete agreements in 
the law-firm context is well established, there has been limited 
attention to the prohibition as it relates to such agreements between 
corporate in-house counsel and their employers.18 In fact, the most 
formal pronouncement on the subject comes from a state ethics 
opinion, rather than a court. In July 2006, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics addressed the 
issue directly and announced that the flat prohibition on restrictive 
covenants applicable to outside counsel is equally applicable to in-
house counsel.19  
In the ten years since the New Jersey Opinion was issued, the 
demand for in-house counsel has continued to grow, and lateral 
movement by in-house counsel has triggered a number of cases 
involving the misappropriation of trade secrets by in-house attorneys 
for the gain of direct competitors.20 Yet surprisingly little attention 
 
Considerations in the Attorney–Client Relationship, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791, 846 (1991). 
Anderson and Steele posit:  
Whether the fulcrum for balancing interests of clients over those of their lawyers is a 
narcissistic concept of ourselves as paragons of professional propriety—as super-
fiduciaries—or the absurdly conflicting notion that good lawyers are hard to find, we 
wonder how much longer these outmoded, unrealistic concepts can be used to deny 
attorneys fair access to the norms of the marketplace, restricted only by the same 
rules applicable to doctors, to ministers, to accountants, and to all other fiduciary-
based professions.  
Id. 
 17. Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 138 P.3d 723, 729 (Ariz. 2006) 
(en banc) (“[Restrictive covenants between lawyers], as is the case with restrictive covenants 
between other professionals, should be examined under the reasonableness standard.”); 
Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 157 (Cal. 1993) (“[W]e can see no legal justification for 
treating partners in law firms differently in this respect from partners in other businesses and 
professions.”). This concept is discussed infra Part II.C.  
 18. Bentrup, supra note 13, at 1037–38; see also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l 
Ethics, Op. 858 (2011) (evaluating the legitimacy of a confidentiality agreement in an in-house 
attorney’s employment contract, and noting that previous decisions regarding Rule 5.6 occurred 
in a “quite different context[]” of law-firm partnership agreements, and therefore do not control 
the interpretation of an in-house attorney’s covenant not to compete).  
 19. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006). As discussed infra Part II.D, 
several other state ethics committees have extended the per se ban to in-house counsel. The 
New Jersey Opinion is largely emblematic of the opinions of other jurisdictions that have taken 
this approach, and is the most explicit about its application and most thoroughly reasoned. 
Therefore, it will often be expressly mentioned in this Note.  
 20. Erik W. Weibust, Daniel P. Hart, Robyn E. Marsh & Andrew J. Masak, SEYFARTH 
SHAW LLP, Lawyer Mobility and Trade Secrets Protection: Restrictive Covenant, Confidentiality, 
and Non-Disclosure Considerations in the Legal Profession, at 2 (2014), http://www.
tradesecretslaw.com/files/2014/12/AIPLA-Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/8NUB-CKHW] (“A spike 
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has been paid to the New Jersey Opinion’s adverse impact on 
businesses and their ability to enter into and enforce reasonable 
noncompete agreements against their former in-house counsel. 
Moreover, commentators posit that “it seems likely that” New 
Jersey’s approach “will be adopted in all jurisdictions that have 
adopted a version of Rule 5.6.”21  
This Note contends that the per se prohibition against in-house 
noncompetes should be abandoned in favor of the same 
reasonableness test that has been applied to restrictive covenants 
involving other professions. First, the already-dubious justifications 
for the prohibition in the context of outside counsel—ranging from 
the special ethical obligations of law firms to the promotion of client 
choice in retaining existing legal representation—cannot be logically 
extended to in-house counsel. Unlike outside counsel, the in-house 
attorney only has one client at a time. As such, the in-house counsel 
voluntarily constrains his professional autonomy and effectively 
eliminates any concern regarding client choice. Second, as the in-
house counsel provides both legal and business advice, the existing 
ethical rules on confidentiality are inadequate to protect a corporate 
employer’s legitimate interests. Under Rule 1.9, a former in-house 
counsel may disclose and utilize his former corporate employer’s 
confidential business information for the benefit of his new, 
competing corporate employer, if he obtained such confidential 
information while performing his nonlegal duties.22 Ultimately, the 
 
in the number of recent cases [involving misappropriation of trade secrets by in-house counsel] 
has brought the issue of restrictive covenants in the legal profession into the limelight.”); see 
also Melissa Maleske, Why GCs Should Think Twice Before Signing a Noncompete, 
LAW360 (Sept. 16, 2015, 2:22 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/702350/why-gcs-should-
think-twice-before-signing-a-noncompete [http://perma.cc/8628-DSU3] (providing examples of 
misappropriation of confidential information by in-house counsel). 
 21. Jessica Montello, The Future of Non-Compete Agreements in In-House Practice, ACC 
DOCKET, Nov. 2014, at 72, 80. 
 22. See N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006) (conceding that an “in-house 
lawyer could obtain confidential information and/or trade secrets which would not be protected 
by Rule 1.6, or the attorney-client privilege,” and that it may be reasonable for a corporation to 
ask its lawyers to sign nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements to fill in these gaps in the 
ethical rules); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) 
(noting that “general knowledge of the client’s policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude 
a subsequent representation”); id. r. 1.6 cmt. 3 (“The confidentiality rule, for example, applies 
not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating 
to the representation, whatever its source.”); id. r. 1.7 cmt. 6 (“[S]imultaneous representation in 
unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as 
representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily 
constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.”); id. 
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legal profession should not let its steadfast refusal to adopt a 
reasonableness test in the law-firm context prevent it from adopting a 
reasonable exception for in-house counsel that is fair to corporate 
employers. 
This Note is segmented into four Parts. Part I provides a 
historical overview of the prevailing common-law approach to 
enforcing restrictive employment covenants. Part II explores how 
restrictive covenants have been applied to the legal profession 
generally, and to in-house counsel specifically. Part III provides a 
critical analysis of proffered justifications for the per se ban, argues 
that the existing ethical obligations are insufficient to protect 
corporate interests, and asserts that the New Jersey standard should 
be replaced with a standard common-law reasonableness test in the 
context of in-house counsel. Part IV proposes that an antitrust lawsuit 
is an alternative route that could credibly be utilized to effectuate the 
suggested modification of the per se prohibition’s applicability to in-
house counsel in light of the Supreme Court’s recent willingness to 
enforce the Sherman Act against state agencies. Specifically, Part IV 
asserts that reasonable noncompete agreements have long been 
understood to be efficiency enhancing, and therefore an outright ban 
on such agreements between corporate employers and in-house 
counsel is anticompetitive and a likely violation of the Sherman Act. 
I.  COMMON-LAW TREATMENT OF NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS  
Noncompete agreements present restraint-of-trade issues “that 
have been before courts for more than five centuries, and 
consequently, there is a wealth of authority on the subject.”23 A 
handful of states, including California, Oregon, Texas, Colorado, and 
Florida, have enacted specific statutes to regulate noncompete 
 
r. 1.9, cmt. 2 (providing that “a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former 
client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of 
that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior 
client”). 
 23. Kenneth Engel, Note, Should Minnesota Abandon the Per Se Rule Against Law Firm 
Noncompetition Agreements?, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 133, 140 & n.28 (1997) (discussing 
Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952)). In 
regard to the range of authority, the Arthur Murray court observed, “[Covenants not to 
compete are] not one of those questions on which the legal researcher cannot find enough to 
quench his thirst. To the contrary there is so much authority it drowns him. It is a sea—vast and 
vacillating, overlapping and bewildering.” Arthur Murray, 105 N.E.2d at 687. 
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agreements.24 In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the enforceability 
of covenants not to compete is still determined by common-law 
principles.25 
A. The Common-Law Reasonableness Test 
Early English common law flatly prohibited noncompete 
restrictions on employees.26 Thereafter, it “became apparent to the 
people and the courts that it was in the interest of trade that certain 
covenants in restraint of trade should be enforced.”27 Thus, dating 
back to 1711, courts have permitted noncompete agreements ancillary 
to an employment relationship, subject to a fact-specific 
reasonableness test.28 
The reasonableness of a covenant is assessed with respect to the 
time that the contract was made, and the underlying question is a 
matter of law for the court to decide.29 Most courts articulate this 
reasonableness inquiry in the form of a three-pronged test.30 A 
restraint on employment is only reasonable if it (1) is no “greater than 
is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer”; (2) 
does not “impose an undue hardship on the employee”; and (3) is not 
“injurious to the public interest.”31 If the covenant violates any of 
 
 24. See generally THOMSON REUTERS, Non-Compete Agreements (Statutes), 0060 SURVEYS 
23 (2014) (listing statutes that address the legality and enforceability of noncompete agreements 
in U.S. jurisdictions).  
 25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing 
an overview of each jurisdiction’s approach). 
 26. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(“Contracts that were in unreasonable restraint of trade at common law were not unlawful in 
the sense of being criminal, or giving rise to a civil action for damages in favor of one 
prejudicially affected thereby, but were simply void, and were not enforced by the courts.”).  
 27. Id. at 280. 
 28. Id. at 279 (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347; 1 P. Wms. 181). 
 29. Tech. Aid Corp. v. Allen, 591 A.2d 262, 265 (N.H. 1991). Courts assess each 
noncompete covenant based on the circumstances of the case. See, e.g., Turner v. Robinson, 107 
S.E.2d 648, 650 (Ga. 1959) (evaluating a covenant not to compete based on the particular 
circumstances of the case); Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 245 N.E.2d 263, 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (same); 
Iowa Glass Depot, Inc. v. Jindrich, 338 N.W.2d 376, 382 (Iowa 1983) (same); Becker v. Bailey, 
299 A.2d 835, 838 (Md. 1973) (same); Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Minn. 
1965) (same); Greenwich Mills Co. v. Barrie House Coffee Co., 91 A.D.2d 398, 400–01 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1983) (same); Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 409 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1966) 
(same). 
 30. See, e.g., Tech. Aid Corp., 591 A.2d at 265–66. 
 31. Id.; see also Merrimack Valley Wood Prods. v. Near, 876 A.2d 757, 762 (N.H. 2005) 
(“Nonetheless, restrictive covenants are valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable, 
given the particular circumstances of the case.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
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these prongs, the restriction is unreasonable and therefore 
unenforceable.32 
In the context of an employment agreement, it is generally 
accepted that an employer has a legitimate interest in restraining the 
employee from appropriating trade secrets, confidential information, 
and customer relationships to which the employee has had access “in 
the course of his employment.”33 An employer generally cannot 
restrict a former employee from soliciting new clients or its existing 
clients with whom the employee had no actual contact.34 
 
§ 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that a non-compete agreement “is unreasonably in 
restraint of trade” if “the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate 
interest, or . . . the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely 
injury to the public”). 
 32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
 33. Id. cmt. b; see also, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Rogers, 418 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(“Under Missouri law, covenants not to compete may be enforced, for ‘an employer has a 
proprietary right in his stock of customers and their good will.’” (quoting Mills v. Murray, 472 
S.W.2d 6, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971))); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 324, 324 
(D. Minn. 1980) (“Minnesota has [a] significant interest in protecting [its] corporations from loss 
of trade secrets and confidential information.”); Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc. v. May Dep’t 
Stores Co., 157 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (“A restrictive covenant . . . is only valid 
and enforceable if it is necessary to protect trade secrets and customer contacts . . . .”); Easy 
Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz, 964 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“An employer may 
only seek to protect . . . its trade secrets and its stock in customers.” (citing Orchard Container 
Corp. v. Orchard, 601 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980))). For a sampling of cases enforcing 
covenants not to compete to protect trade secrets and confidential information, see Brockley v. 
Lozier Corp., 488 N.W.2d 556, 564 (Neb. 1992) (finding an interest in protecting the confidential 
information of the employer, but striking down the five-year duration of the covenant); 
Whitmyer Bros. v. Doyle, 274 A.2d 577, 583 (N.J. 1971) (“The doubtful nature of the employer’s 
claimed trade secrets or confidential information and the comprehensiveness of the verified 
denials by the former employees clearly point to the inappropriateness of any preliminary relief 
grounded on the suggested legitimate interests of the employer in its trade secrets or 
confidential information.”); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 524 A.2d 866, 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1987) (“[T]here is a legitimate interest of the employer to foster the free exchange of 
ideas by its employees without fear that the employees will use trade secrets or confidential 
information learned during such interchange to the employer’s disadvantage within a 
reasonable time following the termination of employment.”).  
 34. Many cases heavily emphasize the former employee’s customer contacts or lack 
thereof. Compare Wolf & Co. v. Waldron, 366 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (upholding 
an injunction that was limited to dealing with former clients), 4408, Inc. v. Losure, 373 N.E.2d 
899, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (upholding a restriction), and E. Distrib. Co. v. Flynn, 567 P.2d 
1371, 1379 (Kan. 1977) (upholding the modification of a restriction to those countries and those 
sales activities in which the employee had been engaged), with Folsom Funeral Serv. v. Rodgers, 
372 N.E.2d 532, 533–34 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (refusing to enforce restriction because customer 
contacts did not have a great impact on undertaking business), and Brewer v. Tracy, 253 N.W.2d 
319, 322 (Neb. 1977) (refusing to enforce an area prohibition that included nine communities in 
which employee had not worked).  
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Of course, the existence of a legitimate business interest does not 
give the employer the unfettered authority to restrain competition. 
Rather, to be enforceable the covenant must be reasonable with 
respect to “time, territorial effect, [and] the capacity in which the 
employee is prohibited from competing.”35  
This common-law reasonableness test was designed to balance 
the conflicting interests of employers and employees, as well as the 
societal interest in open and fair competition.36 “Employers have a 
legitimate interest in preventing unfair competition through the 
misappropriation of business assets by former employees.”37 But 
employees have their own interest in economic mobility.38 Meanwhile, 
 
 35. Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 598 (Ga. 1982); see also, e.g., Capital 
One Fin. Corp. v. Kanas, 871 F. Supp. 2d 520, 538 (E.D. Va. 2012) (enforcing a restrictive 
covenant, noting that “[t]he careful language . . . is neither ambiguous nor overbroad. Like its 
geographic and temporal limitations . . . the functional scope of the covenant [is] reasonable”); 
Iron Mountain Info. Mgmt. v. Viewpointe Archive Servs., LLC, 707 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106 (D. 
Mass. 2010) (“The reasonableness of a restrictive covenant is judged by the attendant facts and 
circumstances which include whether the business interests to be protected are legitimate, the 
temporal and geographic limitations imposed, and so forth.”); Gordon Document Prods. v. 
Service Techs., Inc., 708 S.E.2d 48, 52–53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (finding no error in the grant of 
summary judgment against an employer that sought to enforce a noncompete agreement that 
was overbroad with respect to its territory and covered activities); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“The extent of the restraint is a critical factor 
in determining its reasonableness. The extent may be limited in three ways: by type of activity, 
by geographical area, and by time.”); 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 891 
(2009) (“When the restraint is for the purpose of protecting customer relationships, [most courts 
find that] its duration is reasonable only if it is no longer than necessary for the employer to put 
a new person on the job and for the new employee to have a reasonable opportunity to 
demonstrate his or her effectiveness to the customer.”). If the restraint is for the purpose of 
protecting the employee from disclosing confidential information or trade secrets, a longer 
duration tends to be reasonable. 54 AM. JUR. 2D, § 891. Likewise, the reasonableness of the 
territory and scope of activity encompassed by the noncompete covenant is entirely dependent 
on the circumstances of the particular case:  
Among the facts to be considered [in assessing the reasonableness of the area of 
restriction] are the area assigned to the employee, the area in which the employee 
actually worked, the area in which the employer operated, the nature of the business, 
the nature of the employee’s duty, the employee’s knowledge of the employer’s 
business operation, and the type of position held by the employee.  
Id. § 895 (footnotes admitted).  
 36. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(explaining the interplay between the competing interests of employers, employees, and the 
public). 
 37. Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete 
Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 115 
(2008).  
 38. See id. at 115 (“[E]mployees have a countervailing interest in their own mobility and 
marketability.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981) (“In the case of a post-employment restraint, the harm caused to the employee may 
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society has an interest in maintaining clear channels of competition 
and fostering a marketplace that properly incentivizes innovation and 
employment.39 Given these competing interests, courts permit 
employee noncompete agreements, but the reasonableness test 
imposes significant safeguards to assure that the agreements benefit 
the marketplace and do not overly burden employees.40 A helpful 
shorthand is that noncompete agreements are allowed for the 
purpose of protecting legitimate business interests and not for the 
purpose of punishing the departing employee.41 
B. The Common-Law Reasonableness Test Applied to Nonattorney 
Professionals 
Outside the legal profession, this reasonableness test governs 
covenants not to compete for every business and professional in the 
United States—including doctors, ministers, accountants, 
neurosurgeons, veterinarians, engineers, and all other fiduciary-based 
professionals.42 In fact, courts often recognize that it is especially 
important to uphold reasonable covenants not to compete in 
 
be excessive if the restraint inhibits his personal freedom by preventing him from earning his 
livelihood if he quits . . . .”).  
 39. See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (“[O]ur 
economy is premised on the competition engendered by the uninhibited flow of services, talent 
and ideas.”).  
 40. See, e.g., id. (“[N]o restrictions should fetter an employee’s right to apply to his own 
best advantage the skills and knowledge acquired by the overall experience of his previous 
employment.”). 
 41. Healthcare Servs. of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Copeland, 198 S.W.3d 604, 611 (Mo. 2006) (en 
banc). 
 42. Anderson & Steele, supra note 16, at 846; Barton, supra note 6, at 487; see also 
Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 730, 736 (8th Cir. 1965) (upholding an 
engineer’s nationwide covenant not to compete because of knowledge of trade secrets); Schott 
v. Beussink, 950 S.W.2d 621, 625–27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding an accountant noncompete 
agreement); Concord Orthopaedics Prof’l Ass’n v. Forbes, 702 A.2d 1273, 1276 (N.H. 1997) 
(upholding a noncompete agreement that prevented an orthopedist from practicing in a twenty-
five-mile radius for two years); Moore v. Dover Veterinary Hosp., Inc., 367 A.2d 1044, 1048 
(N.H. 1976) (upholding a restrictive covenant that restricted a veterinarian from practicing in a 
twenty-mile radius for five years); Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 887 (N.J. 2005) 
(finding that a neurosurgeon restrictive covenant was not per se unreasonable, but concluding 
that the broad geographic restriction was injurious to public health and required a narrowing of 
scope); Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete Between Physicians: 
Protecting Doctors’ Interests at Patients’ Expense, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 14–23 (1992) 
(covering cases upholding doctor noncompetes).  
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professional employment.43 In Scott v. Gillis,44 the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina explained the rationale for the policy: 
Few professional men would take assistants and [e]ntrust them with 
their business, impart to them their knowledge and skill, bring them 
in contact with their clients and patients, unless they were assured 
that the knowledge and skill imparted and the friendships and 
associations formed would not be used, when the services were 
ended, to appropriate the very business such assistants were 
employed to maintain and enlarge.45 
Although courts emphasize their willingness to enforce 
noncompete covenants involving professionals, they also assign a 
public value to the services these professionals provide. Their concern 
for the public welfare produces keen “judicial scrutiny of restraints 
on . . . ‘professionals’ because of the actual or perceived value of their 
services to the community.”46 The lifeblood of the reasonableness test, 
however, is an individualized examination into the factual 
circumstances surrounding the specific covenant. 
Bauer v. Sawyer47 is a typical noncompete case involving medical 
professionals. In Bauer, a noncompete provision within a medical-
partnership agreement obligated the withdrawing doctor to refrain 
from practice within a twenty-five-mile radius for five years.48 The 
Supreme Court of Illinois recognized that the public had an interest 
in ensuring “adequate medical protection,” and acknowledged that, if 
the requested enforcement injunction were granted, the number of 
doctors in the area “of course . . . [would] be reduced.”49 Since seventy 
doctors served the city at issue, the court was “unable to say that the 
reduction of this number by one will cause such injury to the public as 
 
 43. See, e.g., Lareau v. O’Nan, 355 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. 1962) (“There is no basic public 
policy against such covenants, particularly when they invoke professional services. In fact, the 
policy of this state is to enforce them unless very serious inequities would result.” (citing 
Bradford v. Billington, 299 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Ky. 1957))).  
 44. Scott v. Gillis, 148 S.E. 315 (N.C. 1929). 
 45. Id. at 317. 
 46. Richard A. Lord, 6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 13:6 (4th ed. 2010); see also, e.g., 
Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1282–86 (Ariz. 1999) (considering the public 
interest in the context of a physician’s restrictive covenant, likening the physician–patient 
relationship to that of a lawyer and client, and, although not banning restrictive covenants 
between physicians, ruling that they should be strictly construed for reasonableness and holding 
the particular covenant unenforceable). 
 47. Bauer v. Sawyer, 134 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 1956). 
 48. Id. at 331. 
 49. Id.  
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to justify us in refusing to enforce this contract.”50 In its enforcement 
of the covenant, the court also concluded that, in view of “modern 
methods of transportation and communication” as of 1956, the 
territorial restraint was not unduly burdensome on the doctor.51 
In contrast, in Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza,52 
the court refused to enforce a covenant that restricted a 
gastroenterologist from practicing within a specific twenty-mile radius 
for three years.53 If enforced, only one gastroenterologist would 
practice in a forty-five-mile radius.54 Presented with extensive 
evidence that such shortage would create “critical delays in patient 
care and treatment,”55 and could cause potential life-threatening 
conditions in emergency situations, the court declined to enforce the 
covenant in the interest of public welfare.56 
These are just two examples of countless cases involving nonlegal 
professionals. They are in no way extraordinary.57 To the contrary, 
they represent typical examples of how restrictive postemployment 
covenants have been balanced against the public interest in cases 
involving a wide array of professionals (including attorneys until the 
1960s) for the last three hundred years—based on the reasonableness 
of the restrictive terms in light of the specific factual circumstances. 
  
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.; see also Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 112 N.W.2d 678, 682–83 (Iowa 1962) (enforcing 
the covenant in a territory with over sixty other doctors in the community); Foltz v. Struxness, 
215 P.2d 133, 137–40 (Kan. 1950) (enforcing territorial restrictions in the covenant as 
reasonable); Wilson v. Gamble, 177 So. 363, 366 (Miss. 1937) (“[T]he number of physicians in 
Greenville is amply sufficient . . . . [N]o monopoly was either contemplated by the contracts or 
will result from their enforcement.”). 
 52. Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 373 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. App. 1988), 
aff’d per curiam, 377 S.E.2d 750 (N.C. 1989). 
 53. Id. at 455. 
 54. Id. at 453.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 455; see also Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133, 1136–37 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) 
(invalidating a covenant when presented with extensive evidence that the neonatal unit would 
suffer greatly without defendants’ services, even though the community would still have five 
pediatricians); Ellis v. McDaniel, 596 P.2d 222, 225 (Nev. 1979) (denying enforcement against an 
orthopedic specialist who was the only such physician in his small community). 
 57. For examples of similar cases, see supra notes 51, 56. 
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II.  THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S PER SE BAN 
Notwithstanding the widespread enforcement of noncompete 
agreements against corporate executives, doctors, engineers, 
psychiatrists, and all other business employees, lawyers have 
collectively refused to submit to the restraints of such agreements. 
They have instead asserted that it would be an ethical violation and 
sanctionable offense for an attorney to consent to any agreement that 
limits prospective employment.58 This blanket prohibition has been 
applied consistently to attorneys since a series of advisory ABA 
Ethics Opinions addressed the issue in the early 1960s.59 Interestingly, 
a historical analysis of the per se ban on attorney noncompete 
agreements reveals a dramatic shift in the prohibition’s articulated 
policy justifications.60 
Although the noncompete prohibition’s original justification 
focused primarily on preserving the professional autonomy of 
attorneys,61 the prevailing rationale given by courts today is to provide 
existing clients with the freedom to continue to be represented by a 
departing attorney.62 Courts typically supplement this justification of 
“client choice” by explaining that law-firm employers, unlike 
corporations, have an ethical obligation to subordinate profit motives 
in favor of client service, so the legal profession does not need to 
concern itself with promoting a rule designed to thoroughly protect 
law-firm economic interests.63 As discussed below, multiple bar ethics 
committees (but no courts) have used these justifications to extend 
the prohibition to in-house counsel. 
A. The Original Justification for the Prohibition Focused on 
Protecting the Attorney’s Right to Practice Law 
The initial rationale for implementing a per se ban on attorney 
noncompete agreements was based entirely on concerns with the 
right of an attorney to practice law, rather than a client’s right to 
choose counsel. Specifically, the path toward today’s per se ban began 
with the issuance of Formal Opinion 300 by the ABA Committee on 
 
 58. Ewald, supra note 10, at 6–7. 
 59. Id. 
 60. For an excellent analysis of the shift from professional-autonomy justifications to 
client-centric justifications, see id. at 6–12. 
 61. See infra Part II.A. 
 62. See infra notes 87–96 and accompanying text. 
 63. See infra Part III.A.3. 
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Professional Ethics in 1961.64 In ABA Formal Opinion 300, the ABA 
Committee was asked to evaluate whether a law firm could “include 
as part of the employment contract a restrictive covenant prohibiting 
the [attorney] from practicing law in the city and county for two years 
after the termination of employment.”65 The Committee 
acknowledged the common use of restrictive covenants in business 
transactions, but held that restrictive covenants for attorneys were 
unethical because they were an “unwarranted restriction on the right 
of a lawyer to choose where he will practice and inconsistent with 
[their] professional status.”66 The Committee made no reference at all 
to maintaining a client’s freedom to choose legal counsel.67 
This concern over the right of a lawyer to practice, rather than a 
client’s freedom to choose counsel, was directly reinforced the next 
year in ABA Informal Opinion 521.68 In this ruling, the ABA 
addressed whether the analysis in Formal Opinion 300 would also 
prohibit similar restrictions in a partnership agreement.69 Focusing 
solely on lawyers’ interests instead of clients’, the ABA Committee 
postulated that a restrictive covenant in a partnership agreement 
would be permissible.70 It explained that in negotiating a partnership 
agreement, “the parties are dealing on an equal footing and [the 
ABA Committee] believes restrictive covenants within reasonable 
and legal limits as between the partners do not involve any questions 
of ethics.”71 
In short, the ethical suitability of an attorney covenant not to 
compete “was viewed in these early advisory opinions as dependent 
upon the relative bargaining power of the lawyers and issues of 
fairness among lawyers, rather than upon any articulated potential for 
harm to the clients.”72 According to the ABA’s 1962 Informal 
Opinion, a restrictive covenant entered into by lawyers with equal 
 
 64. See Ewald, supra note 10, at 5 (explaining that the prior lack of concern for 
noncompetes in the legal profession “all changed in 1961 when the ABA issued Formal Opinion 
300 declaring unethical the use of traditional restrictive covenants—those prohibiting a 
departing lawyer from practicing in the community for a stated period”). 
 65. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. (failing to reference a client’s freedom to choose legal counsel in opinion). 
 68. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 521 (1962). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Robert M. Wilcox, Enforcing Lawyer Non-Competition Agreements While Maintaining 
the Profession: The Role of Conflict of Interest Principles, 84 MINN. L. REV. 915, 926 (2000). 
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bargaining power would be analyzed under the same reasonableness 
standard applied to a restrictive covenant in any other profession or 
occupation.73 
Six years later, the ABA did a dramatic about-face and explicitly 
overruled Informal Opinion 521 with its issuance of Informal Opinion 
1072.74 This 1968 Informal Opinion held that the per se prohibition on 
attorney noncompetes applied equally to employment agreements 
and partnership agreements.75 The ABA Committee asserted, 
The right to practice law is a privilege granted by the State, and so 
long as a lawyer holds his license to practice, this right cannot and 
should not be restricted by such an agreement. The attorneys should 
not engage in an attempt to barter in clients, nor should their 
practice be restricted. The attorney must remain free to practice 
when and where he will and to be available to . . . clients who might 
desire to engage his services.76 
Although the Committee’s primary justification for the rule still 
appears to have been based on the professional autonomy of the 
lawyer, Informal Opinion 1072 provides the first endorsement of 
prohibiting attorney noncompete agreements based partially on the 
justification that clients have a right to select the attorney of their 
choice.77 
In 1969, the ABA adopted this reasoning into its first official 
ethics code, the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 
2-108.78 The restriction remained in effect through 1983, at which 
point the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct codified the 
restriction in Rule 5.6(a).79 The Comments to the Model Rule provide 
two specific justifications for prohibiting attorney noncompete 
agreements: (1) “limiting [lawyers’] professional autonomy” and (2) 
“limiting the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer.”80 
 
 73. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 521 (1962).  
 74. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 1072 (1968). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (emphasis added). 
 77. Ewald, supra note 10, at 6–12. 
 78. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
 79. Rule 5.6(a) states, “A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making . . . [an] 
agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, 
except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 5.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 80. Id. r. 5.6 cmt. 1. 
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B. The Primary Justification Has Shifted to Protecting a Client’s 
Right to Choose Counsel 
Despite the initial focus on preventing a restriction on an 
attorney’s right to practice law, the prevailing and current justification 
for the prohibition is preserving the client’s right to choose counsel.81 
The seminal case in the field is Dwyer v. Jung,82 which struck down 
the use of a noncompete covenant included in a partnership 
agreement between lawyers.83 The contested covenant in Dwyer 
“parcel[ed] out named clients to specific partners upon dissolution 
and prevent[ed] one partner from intruding upon another’s clients for 
a period of five years.”84 The court began its analysis by noting that 
“[a] lawyer’s clients are neither chattels nor merchandise, and his 
practice and good will may not be offered for sale.”85 The court then 
concluded that the contested covenant violated DR 2-108(A), and 
was therefore “void as against public policy,” because the covenant 
restricted “the right of the lawyer to choose his clients in the event 
they seek his services” and “the right of the client to choose the lawyer 
he wishes to represent him.”86 
Significantly, the covenant in Dwyer prohibited departing 
attorneys from representing existing firm clients.87 This is by no means 
uncommon in cases concerning attorney noncompete agreements. 
Indeed, a review of the case law reveals that the fundamental 
rationale for the per se ban is to permit existing clients to choose to 
continue to be represented by a departing attorney, rather than to 
provide the public—prospective clients—unfettered access to the 
maximum number of attorneys. 
The oft-cited88 case of Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord89 helps 
illustrates this point. The Cohen court struck down a provision in a 
 
 81. Ewald, supra note 10, at 6–12; see also, e.g., Eisenstein v. David G. Conlin, P.C., 827 
N.E.2d 686, 690 (Mass. 2005) (“Rule 5.6 exists to protect the strong interests clients have in 
being able to choose freely the counsel they determine will best represent their interests.”). 
 82. Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), aff’d per curiam, 348 A.2d 
208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). 
 83. Id. at 501. 
 84. Id. at 499. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 501 (emphasis added). 
 87. See id. at 499 (noting that the terms of the agreement applied to existing firm clients).  
 88. Peter W. Rogers, Who Gets the Jewels When a Law Firm Dissolves? The Unfinished 
Business Doctrine and Hourly Matters, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 311, 323 (2013) (referring to Cohen 
as “one of its decisions that courts in many jurisdictions have cited”). 
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partnership agreement that placed a financial disincentive on 
competing with the firm, explaining that “[w]hile a law firm has a 
legitimate interest in its own survival and economic well-being and in 
maintaining its clients, it cannot protect those interests by . . . 
restricting the choices of the clients to retain and continue the 
withdrawing member as counsel.”90 
Even decisions that are often cited for the lofty proposition that 
the per se ban is designed to provide the public with maximum access 
to lawyers actually apply that principle only to situations that would 
restrict existing clients from continued representation. The decision in 
Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus,91 for example, emphasizes 
“public” access to counsel: 
The history behind [RPC 5.6] and its precursors reveals that the 
RPC’s underlying purpose is to ensure the freedom of clients to 
select counsel of their choice, despite its wording in terms of the 
lawyer’s right to practice. The RPC is thus designed to serve the 
public interest in maximum access to lawyers and to preclude 
commercial arrangements that interfere with that goal.92 
But the Jacob court was confronted with a clause in a 
shareholder’s agreement that barred departing attorneys from 
collecting termination compensation if they continued to represent 
existing firm clients within a year of their departure.93 Thus, the 
 
 89. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989).  
 90. Id. at 413 (emphasis added). 
 91. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992). 
 92. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2006) (citing Jacob, 607 A.2d at 146) 
(emphasis added). In response to this passage from Jacob, Professor Linda Sorenson Ewald 
usefully observes, “Clearly, the court in Jacob was correct in its assessment of the modern 
understanding of the rule’s primary purpose—to protect client choice. But, as the history 
suggests, client choice was not the original rationale for the rule and, even today, it is not the 
rule’s only purpose.” Ewald, supra note 10, at 11. For this second proposition, Ewald quotes 
Donnelly v. Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville, Schoenebaum & Walker, P.L.C., 599 
N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1999), for its facetious, yet keenly astute observation:  
[W]hile promoting client choice may have been recognized as the primary purpose of 
the rule, it is not the Rules’ only purpose. . . . [T]here is no[] doubt that the Rule is 
designed to permit attorneys to have retirement plans that have noncompetition 
conditions—there is simply no other explanation for the exception to the Rule.  
Id. at 11 n.43 (first two alterations in original) (quoting Donnelly, 599 N.W.2d at 681).  
 93. Jacob, 607 A.2d at 144. When applying Rule 5.6, the vast majority of jurisdictions that 
have addressed the issue have agreed with the reasoning of Jacob by concluding that indirect 
penalties, as well as direct prohibitions, on postdeparture competition violate the rule. See, e.g., 
Pettingell v. Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, 687 N.E.2d 1237, 1239 (Mass. 1997) (“The strong 
majority rule in this country is that a court will not give effect to an agreement that greatly 
penalizes a lawyer for competing with a former law firm, at least where the benefits that would 
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“clients’ free choice of counsel,”94 which Jacob was concerned about 
upholding, could not have been that of prospective clients because 
the relevant agreement in no way limited prospective clients’ 
interests. Rather, Jacob’s main concern, like other decisions invoking 
Rule 5.6(a) to strike down a law-firm restrictive covenant, was with 
the right of existing clients to have continued access to attorneys of 
their choice. In fact, the Jacob decision ultimately explained, “By 
forcing lawyers to choose between compensation and continued 
service to their clients, financial-disincentive provisions may encourage 
lawyers to give up their clients, thereby interfering with the lawyer-
client relationship and, more importantly, with clients’ free choice of 
counsel.”95 Not surprisingly, every case that is cited in the Jacob 
opinion concerns a restrictive covenant that prohibited a departing 
partner or associate from representing the firm’s already-established 
clients.96 
The legislative history of Rule 5.6 also suggests that a focus on 
existing clients was presumably the main motivation for adopting the 
special per se standard. Indeed, as explained in the preceding Part, 
under the common-law reasonableness test a business already could 
not prohibit a former employee from soliciting prospective clients (or 
even existing firm clients with whom the employee had no actual 
contact).97 Thus, if the legal profession’s concern was for prospective 
 
be forfeited accrued before the lawyer left the firm.”); Whiteside v. Griffis & Griffis, P.C., 902 
S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (“Indirect financial disincentives may interfere with this 
right just as much as direct covenants not to compete.”). These opinions reason that an 
enforceable forfeiture-for-competition clause would tend to discourage an attorney from 
withdrawing from a firm, or in the event that the attorney does withdraw, from competing with 
the firm. This discouragement, the courts assert, would tend to restrict a client’s choice of 
counsel. See, e.g., Pettingell, 687 N.E.2d at 1239 (“An enforceable forfeiture-for-competition 
clause would tend to discourage a lawyer who leaves a firm from competing with it. This in turn 
would tend to restrict a client or potential client’s choice of counsel.”). 
 94. Jacob, 607 A.2d at 148.  
 95. Id. (emphasis added). 
 96. See, e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1262 (Mass. 1989) (reinterpreting a 
partnership agreement to bring it into compliance with the Massachusetts’ equivalent of Rule 
5.6, and stating that the “strong public interest in allowing clients to retain counsel of their 
choice outweighs any professional benefits derived from a restrictive covenant”); Cohen v. 
Graham, 722 P.2d 1388, 1391 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (denying enforcement of a partnership-
agreement provision prohibiting departing lawyers from representing a firm’s clients); D.C. Bar 
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 181 (1987) (determining that a prohibition on a departing partner’s 
“interference” with the firm’s clients violates DR 2–108(A)); Tex. State Bar Prof’l Ethics 
Comm., Op. 422 (1984) (prohibiting agreements restricting former employees from practicing 
law in competition with their former firm, or from representing former clients of the firm). 
 97. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
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clients, it would have little need to adopt a new standard that 
effectively duplicated what was already established by hundreds of 
years’ worth of common-law precedent. 
C. A Small Minority of Courts Have Rejected the Per Se Ban 
Notwithstanding general judicial adherence to Rule 5.6, a few 
jurisdictions have rejected the Rule as unjustifiably distinguishing the 
legal profession from every other profession. 
In the seminal case of Howard v. Babcock,98 the California 
Supreme Court considered an agreement among law partners that 
required a partner to forfeit all withdrawal benefits if the partner 
withdrew from the firm and, within one year of the withdrawal, 
engaged in the firm’s specialty practice area within the Los Angeles 
or Orange County court systems.99 Nevertheless, four partners left the 
firm and immediately started a competing practice in the restricted 
area, drawing over two hundred cases away from the former firm.100 
The Babcock court concluded that the agreement did not restrict 
the right of a partner to practice law, but rather “attache[d] an 
economic consequence to a departing partner’s unrestricted choice to 
pursue a particular kind of practice.”101 The court explained that law 
firms have economic interests to protect just like any other business, 
and rejected the contention “that the practice of law is not 
comparable to a business.”102 Indeed, the court could “see no legal 
justification for treating partners in law firms differently in this 
respect from partners in other businesses and professions.”103 
The California Supreme Court carefully considered alternative 
arguments before making this precedential assertion. In fact, the 
court went on to directly challenge the propriety of Rule 5.6’s 
fundamental justifications: 
Upon reflection, we have determined that these courts’ steadfast 
concern to assure the theoretical freedom of each lawyer to choose 
whom to represent and what kind of work to undertake, and the 
theoretical freedom of any client to select his or her attorney of 
choice is inconsistent with the reality that both freedoms are actually 
 
 98. Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993). 
 99. Id. at 151. 
 100. Id. at 152. 
 101. Id. at 156. 
 102. Id. at 159. 
 103. Id. at 157. 
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circumscribed. Putting aside lofty assertions about the uniqueness of 
the legal profession, the reality is that the attorney, like any other 
professional, has no right to enter into employment or partnership in 
any particular firm, and sometimes may be discharged or forced out 
by his or her partners even if the client wishes otherwise. Nor does 
the attorney have the duty to take any client who proffers 
employment, and there are many grounds justifying an attorney’s 
decision to terminate the attorney-client relationship over the 
client’s objection. Further, an attorney may be required to decline a 
potential client’s offer of employment despite the client’s desire to 
employ the attorney.104 
In 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court in Fearnow v. Ridenour, 
Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C.105 followed Babcock’s lead and 
enforced an agreement that financially disincentivized competition by 
attorneys.106 Like the court in Babcock, the Arizona Supreme Court 
found that such agreements should be held to the same 
reasonableness standards applied to all other fiduciary-based 
professionals.107 In abandoning the majority position, the court ruled it 
was “unable to conclude that the interests of a lawyer’s clients are so 
superior to those of a doctor’s patients (whose choice of a physician 
may literally be a life-or-death decision) as to require a unique rule 
applicable only to attorneys.”108 
D. Applicability of the Noncompete Restrictions to In-House Counsel 
Although most courts follow the per se ban against noncompete 
covenants involving law firms, this author’s research revealed no 
instance in which a court has used Rule 5.6 to invalidate a restrictive 
covenant between a corporate employer and its in-house-counsel 
employee. In fact, in-house counsel, just as their nonlawyer 
counterparts, regularly sign such agreements when they begin 
employment.109 Nevertheless, several state bar associations have 
found these agreements “unethical” under Rule 5.6(a), and 
 
 104. Id. at 158–59 (citation omitted).  
 105. Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 138 P.3d 723 (Ariz. 2006) (en 
banc). 
 106. Id. at 724. 
 107. Id. at 729. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Montello, supra note 21, at 73 (“[P]ast decades have seen a marked increase in the 
use of anti-competitive covenants.”).  
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commentators believe that other jurisdictions will follow in due 
course.110 
There are compelling reasons for treating in-house counsel 
differently under Rule 5.6(a), and the early history of the Rule 
suggests that it was designed for the law-firm context. DR 2-108(A) 
(the predecessor to Rule 5.6), in relevant part, stated, “A lawyer shall 
not be a party to or participate in a partnership or employment 
agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to 
practice law after the termination of a relationship.”111 Because a 
corporate employer is not a lawyer, an agreement between in-house 
counsel and a corporate employer clearly did not fall within the 
technical confines of the original per se ban. 
The ABA, in the first opinion to evaluate the applicability of DR 
2-108(A) to in-house counsel, confirmed this interpretation of the 
text, concluding that an in-house counsel’s covenant not to compete, 
“does not violate DR [2]-108(A).”112 In that same opinion, however, 
the Committee described such covenants as “undesirable surplusage,” 
because the existing ethical canons already protect client confidences, 
and further restriction would “denigrate[] the dignity of the 
profession.”113 The opinion made no reference to a client’s right to 
choose counsel. 
In 1983, the ABA replaced the Model Code and DR2-108(A) 
with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and an almost-
identical Rule 5.6(a).114 Nonetheless, the Comments to new Rule 5.6 
articulated a new rationale for the prohibition by explaining that 
“[the] agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to 
 
 110. E.g., id. at 80 (“Based on the current trend cited in Opinion 708, it seems likely that the 
same approach will be adopted in all jurisdictions that have adopted a version of Rule 5.6.”).  
 111. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (emphasis 
added).  
 112. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1301 (1975). In its 
original text, the Committee erroneously cited DR2-108(A) as 7-108(A). Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2013, at 667 
(Art Garwin ed., 2013). The relevant language of Rule 5.6(a) prohibited a lawyer from being a 
party to or participating in postemployment restrictions with “a lawyer,” rather than “another 
lawyer,” as previously provided in DR 2-108. Id.; see also Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & 
Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 147 (N.J. 1992) (“However, because the wording of DR 2–108(A) and 
RPC 5.6 is so similar, the same reasoning is applicable to both.”).  
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practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional 
autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer.”115 
Although the text of Rule 5.6(a) was extremely similar to the 
text of its predecessor rule DR 2-108(A), the ABA’s interpretation of 
Rule 5.6(a) soon departed from its prior interpretations of DR 2-
108(A). In 1994, the ABA held that an employment agreement that 
prohibited in-house counsel from ever representing someone against 
the corporation violated Rule 5.6(a).116 In reaching its decision, the 
Committee stated, “While ethical standards already in place (in 
Model Rule 1.9) prohibit a lawyer from undertaking some 
representations adverse to former clients, an agreement denying the 
lawyer the opportunity to represent any interest adverse to a former 
client is an overbroad and impermissible restriction on the right to 
practice.”117 The Committee also likened the restriction to one in a 
partnership agreement, asserting, 
The public would be restricted from access to lawyers who, by virtue 
of their background and experience, might be the best available 
lawyers to represent them. While a current client’s interests should 
assume a certain priority for the lawyer, the extent of those interests 
that continue to have a claim on the lawyer after the lawyer-client 
relationship is terminated is defined by the scope of the restriction 
contained in Model Rule 1.9.118 
Since the 1994 ABA opinion, only seven state bar committees 
have specifically addressed the topic of in-house noncompete 
agreements. Four of them—the District of Columbia, Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina—followed the ABA’s lead, voiding 
the agreements without providing substantive bases for their 
decisions.119 In 2006, New Jersey followed suit, extending the ban to 
in-house counsel in a detailed advisory opinion.120 
 
 115. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 114, at 668 (emphasis added). The 
specific reference to “partners and associates” remained in the Model Rules until 2002. At that 
point, it was replaced with “lawyer.” See id. at 667–68. 
 116. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-381 (1994). The 
particular agreement in question did not appear to be specifically designed to protect 
confidential information, and it provided no express justification for imposing the restraint. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 291 (1999); Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance 
Comm., Op. 96-5 (1996); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 00-11 (2000); 
Va. Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1615 (1995). South Carolina’s opinion is emblematic 
of this approach—voiding the agreement as violating the “clear provisions of Rule 5.6,” without 
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The New Jersey Opinion is now the area’s leading opinion.121 In 
Opinion 708, the New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Committee on 
Professional Ethics considered the propriety of a corporate 
employment contract that included a clause prohibiting an attorney 
from seeking employment with a competitor for one year after 
termination, so as to prevent the disclosure of confidential 
information and trade secrets.122 The Committee began its opinion by 
citing to Jacob for the proposition that Rule 5.6 is “designed to serve 
the public interest in maximum access to lawyers and to preclude 
commercial arrangements that interfere with that goal.”123 The 
Committee went on to conclude that “[t]he fact that the restrictive 
covenant agreement in question arises in the corporate context, 
rather than within a law firm, is of no moment,” citing prior decisions 
of the ABA, Virginia, Connecticut, Washington, and Pennsylvania as 
proof that an “overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the United 
States” agree.124 
 
any further analysis. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 00-11 (2000). 
However, the South Carolina Committee also usefully explained, 
[F]ully consistent with Rule 1.6 and Rule 5.6, the corporation could insist that a 
lawyer employee sign a confidentially [sic] agreement promising to preserve the 
corporation’s trade secrets as a condition to employment. . . . Thus, pursuant to the 
law of trade secrets, and consistent with the provisions of Rules 1.6, 1.7, and 1.9, in 
some circumstances, accepting employment with one employer may preclude certain 
other subsequent employment. Rule 5.6 is not so broad as to change that result. 
Moreover, the lawyer may enter into an appropriate confidentiality agreement even if it 
has some impact on the lawyer's future employment opportunities.  
Id. (emphasis added).  
 120. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006). By contrast, Connecticut and 
Washington have held that such agreements are permissible if they include a “savings clause” 
indicating that the covenants are “to be interpreted to comply with any applicable rules of 
professional conduct.” Id.; see also Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 02-05 
(2002) (agreeing with the New Jersey approach of permitting such agreements when they 
include a savings clause); Wash. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 2100 
(2005) (same). A savings clause typically clarifies that the Rule’s per se prohibition against 
noncompete agreements applies only to legal representation, and not to future employment 
with a competitor in a nonlegal capacity. Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 
02-05 (2002). Thus, the savings-clause approach provides no meaningful insight into whether or 
not the agreements are permissible. These opinions essentially say that as long as the covenant 
does not violate Rule 5.6, it will not violate Rule 5.6. 
 121. See Bentrup, supra note 13, at 1039 (discussing how a “majority of jurisdictions” have 
taken an approach similar to the New Jersey Opinion).  
 122. Id. at 1046.  
 123. Id. at 1041 (quoting Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 146 (N.J. 
1992)). 
 124. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006). 
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Although the Committee struck down the restrictive covenant, it 
explained that “general rules concerning confidential information, 
[Rule] 1.6, or attorney-client privilege are easy to state, [but] they are 
often difficult to apply to in-house counsel, because legal advice given 
in the corporate setting ‘is often intimately intertwined with and 
difficult to distinguish from business advice.’”125 The Committee went 
on to explain that it is particularly important to appreciate this 
entanglement of legal and business roles in the context of in-house 
counsel because not all duties of an in-house lawyer may involve the 
practice of law, and communications “made by and to the in-house 
lawyer regarding business matters, management decisions or business 
advice are not protected by the attorney-client privilege” or Rule 
1.6.126 Thus, the Committee concluded that an “in-house lawyer could 
obtain confidential information and/or trade secrets which would not 
be protected by Rule 1.6 or the attorney-client privilege,” and 
therefore a corporation may reasonably ask its lawyers to “sign a non-
disclosure or confidentiality agreement.”127 
Opinions issued in Washington and Connecticut similarly 
recognized the significance of the hybrid legal/business nature of the 
in-house position.128 Connecticut Opinion 02-05 explains that “Rule 
5.6 addresses itself only to restrictions affecting the future practice of 
law. We therefore would not presume to apply Rule 5.6 in a way that 
would limit otherwise permissible restrictions on activities 
constituting something other than ‘the practice of law.’”129 
In the ten years since New Jersey Ethics Opinion 708 was issued, 
the landscape of ethical rules for in-house counsel has undergone a 
seismic change.130 In 2008, the ABA adopted the Model Rule for 
 
 125. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 99 (D.N.J. 
1990)). 
 126. Id. (citing Boca Investing P’ship v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 1998)). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 02-05 (2002); Wash. State Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 2100 (2005). 
 129. Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 02-05 (2002); see also Wash. 
State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 2100 (2005). However, Connecticut and 
Washington adopted a “savings clause” approach by approving in-house counsel noncompete 
agreements with savings clauses because the agreements purportedly did not limit the attorney’s 
professional autonomy or infringe on the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. See supra note 
120. 
 130. See STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY D. SIMON & ANDREW M. PERLMAN, REGULATION OF 
LAWYERS, STATUTES AND STANDARDS 408–09 (concise ed. 2014) (providing a legislative 
history of Rule 5.5).  
HORVITZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016  8:55 PM 
1032 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1007 
Registration for In-House Counsel, which authorizes in-house 
lawyers to provide legal services to their employers without being 
fully admitted to the bar of the state where they work, subject to 
certain conditions.131 Approximately thirty-four states have already 
adopted an in-house registration rule in some form.132 Of those states 
that have not adopted the in-house registration rule, many have 
adopted new ABA Model Rule 5.5(d)(1) or other rules or policies 
that allow in-house lawyers to practice without being admitted.133 
Thus, in-house lawyers are more mobile than they have ever been, 
and vastly more mobile than their outside-counsel counterparts. As 
more and more lawyers move in house and corporations continue to 
insist on protecting their legitimate interests through noncompete 
agreements, the need for a uniform and concisely stated standard 
regarding the applicability of Rule 5.6 to in-house counsel increases in 
importance. 
III.  NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 
AND THEIR CORPORATE EMPLOYERS SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY 
THE REASONABLENESS TEST 
By extending the ban on restrictive covenants to in-house 
counsel, state ethics committees have transformed a questionable 
policy of professional self-regulation into an unjustifiable 
infringement on the legitimate interests of corporate employers. Over 
the last eight years, ethics committees across the country have 
introduced a swath of new guidelines that recognize the fundamental 
differences between law-firm and in-house-counsel positions, and that 
provide in-house counsel with enhanced mobility across 
jurisdictions.134 In light of these changes, it is abundantly clear that the 
legal profession must abandon its outdated and indefensible per se 
ban on restrictive covenants for in-house counsel and replace it with 
the standard reasonableness inquiry that is used to evaluate 
postemployment agreements in every other profession. First, the 
underlying justifications for the per se ban in the law-firm context are 
entirely inapplicable to in-house-counsel positions. Second, as the in-
house counsel provides both legal and business advice, the existing 
 
 131. Id. at 421.  
 132. Id. at xxvi. 
 133. Id.; see also infra notes 166–70 and accompanying text (discussing the amendment of 
Rule 5.5 and its adoption by a vast majority of states) 
 134. See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text. 
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ethical rules on confidentiality are inadequate to protect corporate 
employers’ legitimate interests. Ultimately, the legal profession 
should not let its steadfast refusal to adopt a reasonableness test in 
the law-firm context prevent it from adopting a reasonable exception 
for in-house counsel that is fair to corporate employers. 
A. The Underlying Justifications for the Per Se Ban in the Law-Firm 
Context are Inapplicable to In-House Counsel 
In its first opinion addressing whether the per se ban applied to 
in-house counsel, the ABA straightforwardly conceded that such 
agreements were not covered by the applicable ethical rule’s language 
and, therefore, did not violate its directive.135 As such, it should not be 
surprising that, although the language of the applicable ethical rule 
was modified slightly in subsequent versions, the underlying 
justifications for the rule remain irreconcilable with the nature of the 
in-house position. Specifically, the per se ban’s primary justifications 
are that restrictive covenants limit the freedom of clients to choose a 
lawyer and restrain the professional autonomy of the lawyer.136 It has 
also been noted that the ban on restrictive covenants is permissible 
because law firms have an ethical obligation to subordinate profit 
motives to client service.137 Because an in-house counsel only serves 
one corporate client at a time and has the ability to move among 
states to work as a lawyer in jurisdictions where he is not a member of 
the bar,138 these justifications simply are not transferable. 
1. Limitation On The Freedom Of Clients To Choose a Lawyer.  
As Part II details, the prevailing rationale for prohibiting noncompete 
provisions in a law-firm partnership or employment agreement is 
providing existing clients with the freedom to choose to continue to be 
represented by an attorney who is departing from the firm.139 Courts 
and commentators in favor of the ban note that, in the law-firm 
context, a noncompete agreement can be especially burdensome 
because an existing client is denied the opportunity to continue a 
close fiduciary relationship with a trusted confidant and counsel.140 
 
 135. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1301 (1975). 
 136. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 137. See infra Part III.A.3.  
 138. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra Part II. 
 140. See supra notes 87–97 and accompanying text.  
HORVITZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016  8:55 PM 
1034 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1007 
The abandoned client faces the cost of educating a new attorney on 
the subject of the representation. And, in extreme situations, the 
delay during the transition to a new lawyer could impact the overall 
resolution of the matter.141  
This underlying concern for an existing client’s choice of attorney 
does not apply to the in-house context. By definition, an in-house 
attorney only works for one client at a time—his employer.142 When 
an in-house counsel changes his client/employer, it necessarily follows 
that he cannot continue to represent his original client/employer—
regardless of a noncompete agreement. Indeed, the only way the 
original client/employer could ensure continued representation would 
be to preclude the in-house counsel from pursuing any form of 
alternative employment (regardless of the nature of the new 
company). An employment restriction that sweeping would, of 
course, never be countenanced. In short, in cases involving in-house 
counsel, “the ability of . . . a client to choose that particular lawyer is 
limited by the very nature of the employment arrangement.”143 
The oft-quoted justification for the per se ban as ensuring that 
attorneys not “barter in clients”144 is also inapposite in the context of 
in-house counsel. In the law-firm setting, a group of attorneys with a 
collection of clients might, without the per se ban, attempt to 
contractually specify in advance the surviving attorney–client 
relationships in the event of a firm dissolution or attorney 
departure—effectively “bartering” clients.145 Even if this practice 
might be a bona fide concern in a law firm, the in-house counsel has 
no client relationship to “barter.” When he departs for another 
corporate employer, the in-house counsel has no ability to, or interest 
in, continuing to represent his original client. 
 
 141. Cf. ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS 29, 68 (1990) (explaining the costs 
incurred on clients when they have to change their legal representation).  
 142. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (explaining 
that for an in-house lawyer, the “client” is the company or organization that employs the lawyer 
in a legal capacity). 
 143. Bentrup, supra note 13, at 1058. 
 144. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Informal Op. 1072 (1968). 
 145. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 499 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (refusing to 
enforce a restrictive covenant “parcel[ing] out named clients to specific partners upon 
dissolution”). More often, the noncompete provision would restrict the departing attorney from 
working with any firm clients. See, e.g., Cohen v. Graham, 722 P.2d 1388, 1391 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1986) (refusing to enforce a partnership provision prohibiting departing lawyers from 
representing the firm’s clients). 
HORVITZ IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016  8:55 PM 
2016] AN UNREASONABLE BAN 1035 
Given that the very nature of in-house counsel negates any 
concern for an existing client’s choice, the question remains whether 
there might be a bona fide concern about infringing on the choice of 
prospective clients. A review of the ethical rules clearly shows that no 
such concern exists.146 
As the court in Babcock correctly observed, ethical rules do not 
obligate lawyers to accept every client who wishes to employ them.147 
In fact, a lawyer may decline to represent a client for any number of 
reasons within the lawyer’s discretion, ranging from economic 
considerations to a desire to limit or alter his practice areas.148 
Conflict-of-interest rules also often restrict a client’s right to counsel 
of his choice.149 Indeed, an attorney may withdraw from representing 
a client for nonpayment of fees, even in circumstances in which the 
withdrawal will have a material adverse effect on the client.150 
Significantly, the Model Rules actually mandate a covenant not 
to compete in the sale of a law practice. Rule 1.17 requires the seller 
of a law firm to refrain from the private practice of law in the same 
geographic vicinity of the firm that he is selling.151 Thus, Rule 1.17 not 
only prohibits the attorney from continuing to represent his existing 
clients, it effectively forbids him from working with any prospective 
clients in the area as well.152 The harm to existing and prospective 
clients is indistinguishable from the harm caused by a similar 
 
 146. See Kirstan Penasack, Note, Abandoning the Per Se Rule Against Law Firm Agreements 
Anticipating Competition: Comment on Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 889, 911 (1992) (refuting the contention that there is 
an absolute right of client choice); see generally Robert W. Hillman, Client Choice, Contractual 
Restraints, and the Market for Legal Services, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65 (2007) (providing an 
overview of the restrictions on client choice). 
 147. Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 158 (Cal. 1993).  
 148. Wilcox, supra note 72, at 936. 
 149. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP., AM. BAR. ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 177 (2d ed. 1992) (“Courts have recognized that the ethical 
considerations underlying imputed disqualification must be balanced with the right to one’s free 
choice of counsel.”). 
 150. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  
 151. Id. r. 1.17. Of course, once sold, the clients remain entitled to terminate the relationship 
with the purchaser at their discretion. See id. r. 1.17 cmt. 2 (“The fact that a number of the 
seller’s clients decide not to be represented by the purchasers but take their matters elsewhere, 
therefore, does not result in a violation.”). 
 152. Ironically, Rule 1.17 is so restrictive on the attorney’s professional autonomy and client 
choice that it likely would not be enforceable under the common law. See supra note 34 and 
accompanying text.  
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covenant contained in an employment or partnership agreement.153 
Although the Comments to Rule 1.17 profess the same sentiment 
seen in Rule 5.6 opinions that “[c]lients are not commodities that can 
be purchased and sold at will,” the Rule 1.17 Comments go on to 
explain that it is more important to ensure the purchasing attorney 
obtains adequate “compensation for the reasonable value of the 
practice.”154 Rule 1.17 not only trounces any notion of an unfettered 
right of existing and prospective client choice, it elevates the financial 
well-being of a purchasing attorney over the principles of client 
choice and professional autonomy. It is incomprehensible why ethics 
committees have chosen to flatly forbid a potential client’s choice of 
in-house attorney to be bargained away in reasonable noncompete 
agreements when a business corporation’s economic well-being is on 
the line, but maintain ethical rules that mandate such restrictions 
when a purchasing lawyer’s financial well-being is at issue. 
Even if the legal community’s professed devotion to “client 
choice” were more than just rhetoric, the detriment to the public from 
being deprived of a lawyer’s services is no greater than the detriment 
that the public sustains from being deprived of other professionals’ 
services. State ethics committees justify the per se ban by asserting 
that “by limiting the mobility of lawyers within any given industry, 
clients are left with a smaller and less skilled pool of lawyers from 
which to choose.”155 That is undoubtedly true; covenants not to 
compete do prevent certain members of the public from accessing a 
particular attorney’s skills.156 However, reasonable covenants not to 
compete involving other skilled professionals are regularly enforced, 
with the court rationalizing that “the reduction of . . . [one doctor] will 
[not] cause such injury to the public as to justify . . . refusing to 
enforce [a covenant not to compete].”157 
This logical lapse has been widely criticized by courts158 and 
commentators in a broad range of professions, arguing that it is 
 
 153. John Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete in the Professions, 3 FLA. ST. U. BUS. 
REV. 11, 29 (2003). 
 154. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.17 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 155. Blackburn v. Sweeney, 637 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).  
 156. Of course, noncompete agreements also prevent the public from accessing confidential 
information that a particular attorney could misappropriate. 
 157. Bauer v. Sawyer, 134 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ill. 1956). 
 158. See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 158 (Cal. 1993) (“Putting aside lofty 
assertions about the uniqueness of the legal profession, the reality is that the attorney, like any 
other professional, has no right to enter into employment or partnership in any particular firm, 
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difficult to find a legitimate argument that doctors and other 
fiduciary-based professionals should be treated less favorably than 
lawyers.159 Indeed, in a recent New Jersey Supreme Court case 
denying the extension of a per se ban to doctors’ covenants not to 
compete, the court did not provide a single substantive reason for the 
divergent treatment of noncompetes between lawyers and doctors, 
and instead opted to “continue to rely on [the] Court’s power to 
govern the ethical standards of the legal profession as justification for 
[its] decision to treat [the two professions] differently.”160 Any 
justification that bar associations might proffer in the law-firm context 
would have less force in the realm of in-house attorneys, who provide 
service solely to the country’s business corporations, as opposed to 
individual citizens. 
Ultimately, the in-house counsel’s unique relationship with a 
single client/employer, the ethical rules’ overarching lack of concern 
for prospective clients, and an unsubstantiated public-policy rationale 
for distinguishing lawyers from other professionals are fatal to Rule 
5.6’s professed concern for preserving “client choice” as a legitimate 
justification for invalidating all noncompete agreements between in-
house counsel and corporate employers. 
 
and sometimes may be . . . forced out by his or her partners even if the client wishes 
otherwise.”). 
 159. See Barton, supra note 6, at 490 (listing commentators from both the legal and medical 
profession arguing against this justification); see also Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior 
Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“We find no reason to treat attorneys any 
differently from professionals such as physicians or certified public accountants . . . .”); Cohen v. 
Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 419 (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) (“If the agreement 
pertained to any other business or profession, there would be no question that the parties would 
be held to their bargain.”); HILLMAN, supra note 141, at 29 (“The reasons for distinguishing 
lawyering from other professions in this context are vague, and it is questionable whether the 
availability of choice for the client is any less critical when the professional engaged is a 
physician . . . .”). 
 160. Cmty. Hosp. Grp., Inc. v. More, 869 A.2d 884, 896 (N.J. 2005). The court appealed to 
its authority to regulate the legal profession, and actively pointed out weaknesses in the 
decision. The court explained that “both sides mount strong arguments in favor of their 
respective positions. We recognize the importance of patient choice in the initial selection and 
continuation of the relationship with a physician. We also agree that the similarities between the 
attorney–client and physician–patient relationships are substantial.” Id. at 895. Then, as if to 
acknowledge that its decision could not be rationally justified, the court went on to list an array 
of commentators who have critiqued the policy basis for the different treatment. See id. 
(recognizing that “several commentators have criticized the distinction our law makes between 
physicians and attorneys in respect of restrictive covenants” and citing three such 
commentators). 
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2. The Lawyer’s Right to Practice His Profession.  As detailed in 
Part II.A, the original justification for implementing a per se ban on 
attorney noncompete agreements was a belief that such agreements 
constituted an “unwarranted restriction on the right of a lawyer to 
choose where he will practice and [are] inconsistent with our 
professional status.”161 
The root of this protectionist policy may be attributable to an 
attorney’s traditional lack of mobility when the per se ban was 
implemented.162 When Rule 5.6(a) was promulgated by the ABA,163 
and subsequently adopted by state ethics committees, an attorney 
could only practice law in a jurisdiction where she had passed the 
bar.164 This rule applied to in-house counsel and outside counsel 
alike.165 Thus, if an attorney entered into a covenant not to compete 
that restricted her from working in a geographic vicinity, her 
prospects for future employment were especially constrained. Unlike 
most business executives, the attorney could not simply move to 
another state and start practicing law. Therefore, it was logical that 
state bar associations would be wary of covenants not to compete that 
could place an undue hardship on an attorney’s right to engage in her 
profession. 
Notably, in 2002, ABA Rule 5.5 was amended, drastically 
increasing the geographic mobility of in-house counsel.166 Amended 
Rule 5.5(d)(1) reads, 
A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not 
disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may 
provide legal services in this jurisdiction that (1) are provided to the 
lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services 
for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission.167 
 
 161. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961). 
 162. See Ewald, supra note 10, at 43 (noting a lack of mobility in the attorney’s practice). 
 163. The Rule was adopted in 1983. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1983). 
 164. See id. r. 5.5 (“A lawyer shall not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so 
violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.”). 
 165. Id. r. 5.5 cmt 16. 
 166. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 130, at 408 (providing a legislative history of Model Rule 
5.5).  
 167. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5(d)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (emphasis 
added).  
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At least forty-four states have now adopted a provision similar or 
identical to this provision.168 
In addition to the widespread adoption of Rule 5.5(d)(1), the 
ABA House of Delegates in 2008 approved by voice vote a Model 
Rule on Registration of In-House Counsel to provide a basis of 
uniformity in the regulation of in-house lawyers.169 More than thirty 
states have already adopted similar in-house registration rules, 
bringing increased standardization to the procedural process 
governing multijurisdictional in-house practice.170 
With the recent expansion in multijurisdictional opportunities for 
in-house counsel, these attorneys (as compared to outside counsel 
working in law firms) now enjoy vastly expanded geographic freedom 
to practice wherever they choose. As a result, the special practical 
concerns that likely contributed to adoption of the per se ban on 
attorney noncompete agreements do not apply in the current in-
house counsel context.171 
3. The Economic Interests of a Corporation Are Not Subordinate 
to a Lawyer’s Interest in Professional Autonomy.  Virtually every 
discussion of the per se ban explains that “[t]he Rules of Professional 
Conduct govern the practice of law based on ethical standards, not 
commercial desires.”172 They emphasize that the purpose of the rules 
of professional ethics is to guide the conduct of the attorneys and “not 
to protect the financial interests of law firms.”173 And they assert that 
“[t]he more lenient test used to determine the enforceability of a 
restrictive covenant in a commercial setting, is not appropriate in the 
 
 168. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 130, at 408 (providing a legislative history of Model Rule 
5.5).  
 169. Id. at 421. 
 170. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 130, at xxvi. Additionally, in February 2013, the Rule was 
significantly amended to permit foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) lawyers to register as in-house counsel, 
subject to certain conditions and restrictions. See GILLERS ET AL., supra note 130, at 421 
(providing a legislative history of Model Rule 5.5). 
 171. To continue to prevent a corporation from adequately protecting its rights through 
reasonable noncompete agreements based on blind fidelity to a protectionist principle of 
professional autonomy that was adopted in a radically different setting would be unreflective of 
reality and an abuse of the legal profession’s power to self-regulate. See Linder v. Ins. Claims 
Consultants, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 612, 617 (S.C. 2002) (“Our duty to regulate the legal profession is 
not for the purpose of creating a monopoly for lawyers, or for their economic protection.”). 
 172. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 151 (N.J. 1992); Dwyer v. Jung, 
336 A.2d 498, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (“Commercial standards may not be used to 
evaluate the reasonableness of lawyer restrictive covenants.”). 
 173. Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 165 (Cal. 1993). 
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legal setting.”174 In short, before even engaging in a balancing of the 
conflicting interests of the parties, they assume that “the commercial 
concerns of the firm . . . are secondary to the need to preserve client 
choice.”175 
From this starting point, the justifications of client choice and 
professional autonomy become simple boilerplate. Because courts 
have the exclusive authority to “govern the ethical standards of the 
legal profession,” they can comfortably define the diminished rights 
of law firms.176 Law firms are a construct of courts’ ethical rules177 and, 
under that construct, they have already imposed on firms the “ethical 
obligation to subordinate profit motives in favor of client service.”178 
Against that background, courts essentially weigh the interests of 
client choice against the interests of an entity that is obligated to put a 
client’s right over its own. With the scales tipped so heavily, the 
inevitable product is the per se ban and the conclusion that the 
“protection of the clients’ ability to employ the attorneys they have 
come to trust, is more important than safeguarding the economic 
interests of established attorneys and law firms.”179 
Unlike law firms, corporations are not constructs of legal-ethics 
rules. Ethics committees, like that of New Jersey, fail to acknowledge 
this difference between law firms and corporate employers when they 
apply the same reasoning to restrictive covenants in both employment 
contexts and directly dismiss the distinction as being “of no 
moment.”180 Corporations are not comprised solely of “established 
attorneys.”181 They have no “ethical obligation to subordinate profit 
motives in favor of client service.”182 To the contrary, their duty is to 
maximize value for shareholders.183 
As such, an ethics committee cannot lightly relegate the 
corporation’s interests below the interests of the departing attorney. 
 
 174. Jacob, 607 A.2d at 151 (citations omitted).  
 175. Id.  
 176. See supra note 159–160 and accompanying text. 
 177. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“‘[L]aw firm’ 
denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law firm partnership . . . .”). 
 178. Herbert, supra note 14, at 269 n.162 (stating the applicable North Carolina statute).  
 179. Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 161 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 180. N.J. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 708 (2006). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Cf. Herbert, supra note 14, at 269 n.162 (discussing an applicable North Carolina 
statute, which provides that lawyers do indeed have the obligation to subordinate profit motives 
in favor of client service). 
 183. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681 (Mich. 1919). 
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It is uniformly recognized that corporations have a significant interest 
in protecting their trade secrets and confidential information,184 and 
they regularly use restrictive covenants to protect these interests.185 
Simply because they hire an attorney does not mean they no longer 
have legitimate business interests worth protecting. 
In the law-firm context, it is conceivable to defend the legitimacy 
of the per se ban with the baseline rationale that “the commercial 
concerns of the firm . . . are secondary to the need to preserve client 
choice.”186 However, one cannot replace the word “firm” with 
“corporation,” and assert that this same principle holds true. 
Interestingly, it appears that no court decisions fall prey to this logical 
fallacy. Yet, that is precisely what ethics committees have done by 
expressly extending the per se prohibition on attorney noncompetes 
to encompass in-house counsel. 
B. The Existing Ethical Obligations of an Attorney Do Not 
Adequately Protect the Legitimate Interests of the Corporation 
Perhaps based upon a recognition that the preexisting 
justifications for the per se ban are inapplicable to the in-house role, 
ethics committees have largely justified the extension of the per se 
ban to in-house attorneys by asserting that an attorney’s preexisting 
ethical obligations of confidentiality under Rule 1.9 adequately 
protect corporate employers.187 
 
 184. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 324, 334–35 (D. Minn. 1980) 
(finding that Minnesota has significant interest in protecting its corporations from loss of trade 
secrets and confidential information); Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1993) (upholding restrictive covenant to protect employer’s commercial interests 
against employee’s disclosure of confidential information and trade secrets); Victoria’s Secret 
Stores, Inc., v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 157 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a 
protectable interest in trade secrets and confidential information); Superior Gearbox Co. v. 
Edwards, 869 S.W.3d 239, 247–48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“An employer has protectable interests 
in . . . trade secrets.”).  
 185. Significantly, although these corporations can require in-house counsel to execute 
confidentiality agreements and other protections, it is much easier for the corporation to protect 
itself, as a practical matter, by ensuring that a trusted employee does not depart for a direct 
competitor. That is, of course, precisely why corporations routinely include noncompete 
covenants in their employment agreements. 
 186. Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 151 (N.J. 1992). 
 187. In the first opinion addressing the propriety of covenants not to compete in the in-
house counsel setting, the ABA Ethics Committee made no reference to principles of client 
choice, professional autonomy, or the legitimate interests of the employer, and conceded that 
such agreements were not covered by the language of the applicable ethical rule, and therefore 
did not violate its directive. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1301 
(1975). Yet, despite the text of the rule and its justifications mandating a contrary conclusion, 
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However, Rule 1.9 clearly does not provide adequate protection 
from misappropriation of confidential information. Rule 1.9(a) states, 
“A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially 
related matter in which [the] person’s interests are materially adverse 
to the interest of the former client.”188 This concept is seemingly 
reinforced by one of the Rule’s Comments: “When a lawyer has been 
directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation 
of other clients with materially adverse interests is clearly 
prohibited.”189 The Comment’s “next sentence tends to muddy the 
water a bit”190: “On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled 
a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later 
representing another client in a wholly distinct problem of that type 
even though the subsequent representation involves a position 
adverse to the prior client.”191 Thus, in most cases, the text of Rule 1.9 
does not provide clear guidance for disqualification. 
One abundantly clear aspect of Rule 1.9 is that under its 
directive, an attorney’s duty “to retain confidentiality extends only to 
information ‘relating to [legal] representation of a client.’”192 
“Further, communications made by and to the same in-house lawyer 
regarding business matters, management decisions or business advice 
are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.”193 This principle is 
 
the Ethics Committee noted its disapproval. Although the Committee let the agreement stand, 
it explained that “[t]he Code of Professional Responsibility specifically requires that a lawyer 
shall preserve and protect confidences and secrets of one who has employed him,” and 
therefore the covenant is “undesirable surplusage” that “denigrates the dignity of the 
profession.” Id.; see also, e.g., N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2008) (noting that 
many jurisdictions “have found that non-compete agreements designed to protect against the 
disclosure of a corporation’s confidential information and trade secrets are superfluous, due to a 
lawyer’s overriding obligation to maintain client confidentiality”). In its next opinion on the 
subject, the ABA Committee did not claim that the duties to a former client under Rule 1.9 
protected all of a corporation’s confidences, or that a covenant would be “surplusage”; it merely 
asserted that any restriction beyond those codified in Rule 1.9 “would impermissibly restrain a 
lawyer from engaging in his profession.” ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 94-381 (1994). This reasoning has generally been adopted by state ethics 
committees extending the per se ban to in-house counsel. See, e.g., N.J. Advisory Comm. on 
Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2008) (adopting this stance and listing other jurisdictions that had as 
well). 
 188. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 189. Id. cmt. 2. 
 190. Hyman Cos. v. Brozost, 964 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1997).  
 191. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 192. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 708 (2008).  
 193. Id. 
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important in the context of in-house counsel because legal advice 
given in the corporate setting “is often intimately intertwined with 
and difficult to distinguish from business advice.”194 In fact, the New 
Jersey Ethics Committee that extended the ban even conceded that 
“[n]ot all duties of an in-house lawyer may involve the practice of 
law,”195 and therefore an “in-house lawyer could obtain confidential 
information and/or trade secrets which would not be protected by 
[Rule] 1.6, [1.9] or the attorney-client privilege.”196 This concession is 
fatal to the argument that all in-house-counsel restrictive covenants 
should be barred because the ethical rules provide ample protection 
for corporate confidences. To the contrary, everything that the 
attorney learns during the distinctly “business” portion of his job will 
not be subject to confidentiality restrictions under the ethical rules. 
In light of this void in protection, both the New Jersey and South 
Carolina Committees explained that a corporation may ask its 
lawyers to “sign a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement.”197 
Specifically, the South Carolina Committee explained that “[f]ully 
consistent with [confidentiality rules] and Rule 5.6, the corporation 
could insist that a lawyer employee sign a confidentiality agreement 
promising to preserve the corporation’s trade secrets as a condition to 
employment.”198 Based upon Rules 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, and trade-secret laws, 
the Committee found that “in some circumstances, accepting 
employment with one employer may preclude certain other 
subsequent employment. Rule 5.6 is not so broad as to change that 
result. Moreover, the lawyer may enter into an appropriate 
confidentiality agreement even if it has some impact on the lawyer’s 
future employment opportunities.”199 
By acknowledging that corporations can use confidentiality 
agreements for in-house counsel, ethics committees again are 
implicitly conceding that the existing ethical rules do not adequately 
protect against the threat of disclosing confidential business 
information. However, confidentiality agreements are incapable of 
providing sufficient protection. For all other professions, courts and 
scholars recognize that employers may enforce covenants not to 
 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 00-11 (2000). 
 199. Id. 
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compete in addition to confidentiality agreements because the 
covenant not to compete fills the voids in the confidentiality 
agreement and provides an enhancement necessary to protect 
employer rights.200 
Given the fact that certain aspects of the lawyer’s job as an in-
house counsel are not “legal” or governed by applicable ethics rules, 
lawyers should not be treated any differently from their fellow 
employees whose covenants are assessed under the common-law 
reasonableness test. To the extent that a particular court, based on 
the unique facts of a case, finds that the attorney’s ethical duties 
adequately protect the employer’s rights, the court could circumscribe 
the covenant accordingly under the analytically flexible 
reasonableness test. 
IV.  BAR ASSOCIATIONS THAT PERPETUATE THE PER SE BAN 
COULD FACE ANTITRUST LIABILITY 
When a group of competing professionals agrees to do something 
that benefits itself at the expense of consumers, the collective actors 
typically would be held liable under the Sherman Act201 for 
anticompetitive behavior. As demonstrated in Parts I–III of this Note, 
the extension of the per se ban on restrictive covenants to in-house 
counsel has left corporations exposed to potential misappropriation 
of confidential information and trade secrets, so that attorneys can 
protect their “right to choose where [t]he[y] will practice.”202 This is 
precisely the type of “self-serving”203 behavior that antitrust laws 
condemn. 
State bar associations, however, historically have operated 
largely outside of antitrust jurisdiction based on an assumption that 
they were protected by the state-action immunity doctrine.204 Yet, in 
 
 200. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Restatement’s Supersized Duty of Loyalty Provision, 16 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 395–96 (2012) (describing the growth of the “twin doctrines” of 
noncompetes and trade secret protections); Derek P. Martin, Comment, An Employer’s Guide 
to Protecting Trade Secrets from Employee Misappropriation, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 949, 960 
(asserting that noncompetes “strengthen[] the employer’s case” when trying to protect 
confidential information).  
 201. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 202. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961). 
 203. See Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass’n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 280–81 (Ind. 1983) (rejecting 
doctors’ arguments to extend the per se prohibition on noncompete clauses to their profession, 
instead reasoning that “[t]he [doctors’] self-serving position . . . cannot be upheld”).  
 204. See Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm 
Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 587–88 (1992) (arguing that an ethical rule adopted 
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its recent landmark decision—North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC205—the Supreme Court clarified that state agencies 
controlled by active market participants (like many state bar 
associations) must be under “active supervision” by the state to enjoy 
federal antitrust immunity.206 In the recent months since the Dental 
Board decision, the legal blogosphere has exploded with dozens of 
articles explaining that the Court’s decision likely exposes state bar 
associations to antitrust liability for their protectionist and 
anticompetitive actions.207 Further, corporations and individuals who 
have been disadvantaged by state bar associations’ anticompetitive 
policies, such as LegalZoom, have started to file antitrust lawsuits 
against these associations.208  
This Part proceeds in two Sections. Section A demonstrates how 
the extension of the per se ban on noncompetes to in-house counsel is 
anticompetitive and violates the Sherman Act absent state-action 
immunity. Section B argues that these state bar associations are not 
immune from antitrust liability under the Supreme Court’s Dental 
Board standard. 
 
by a state bar association could be challenged on anticompetitive grounds, but that the Federal 
Trade Commission has declined to pursue these actions). 
 205. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).  
 206. Id. at 1112.  
 207. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Could Dental-Board Decision Unlock Lawyer Control of State 
Bar Regulations?, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2015, 7:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2015/03/04/dental-board-decision-could-unlock-lawyer-control [http://perma.cc/
S58L-WMKC] (“While the case dealt specifically with dentistry . . . the ruling will have far 
broader ramifications for many professions, including how the practice of law is regulated.”); 
Mark Walsh, Dental Board Ruling May Drill into State Bar Associations’ Immunity, ABA 
JOURNAL (May 1, 2015, 6:55 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/dental_
board_ruling_may_drill_into_state_bar_associations_immunity [http://perma.cc/Q64V-5FNT] 
(“The ruling could expose state bar associations and oversight boards to greater antitrust 
liability . . . .”).  
 208. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 5, LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. 
N.C. State Bar, No. 1:15-CV-439 (M.D.N.C. June 3, 2015), 2015 WL 3499887, at ¶ 5 (claiming 
that the State Bar “illegally and unreasonably restrain[ed] trade in the market for legal 
services”). Some plaintiffs in these suits have already settled claims favorably. See, e.g., Terry 
Carter, LegalZoom Resolves $10.5M Antitrust Suit Against North Carolina State Bar, ABA 
JOURNAL (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_
resolves_10.5m_antitrust_suit_against_north_carolina_state_bar [http://perma.cc/QW9V-A8
GQ] (explaining that under its agreement with North Carolina LegalZoom will be allowed to 
continue operating in the state). 
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A. The Extension of the Per Se Ban on Noncompetes to In-House 
Counsel Violates the Sherman Act Absent State-Action Immunity 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits “[e]very 
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”209 To 
establish a Section 1 antitrust violation, a plaintiff must prove “(1) a 
contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that imposed an 
unreasonable restraint of trade.”210 For professional associations 
engaged in self-regulation, such as bar associations, an association’s 
adoption of ethical rules or opinions constitutes evidence of a 
concerted action or agreement sufficient to trigger application of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and therefore meets the first 
prerequisite for its violation.211 Thus, the question often turns to 
whether the association’s action unreasonably restrains competition. 
Under the antitrust rule of reason, “[t]he true test of legality is 
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress 
or even destroy competition.”212 Although many ethical restraints are 
adopted ostensibly to protect or improve “quality of care,” the 
Supreme Court has made clear in at least four decisions that there is 
no blanket quality-of-care defense to otherwise proscribed restraints 
implemented by professionals.213 In assessing the New Jersey Bar 
Association’s ruling in Opinion 708 and ones like it, a full “rule-of-
reason” analysis is required that “consider[s] the facts peculiar to the 
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and 
after the restraint was imposed; [and] the nature of the restraint and 
 
 209. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 210. Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 202 (4th Cir. 2002)).  
 211. E.g., N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 356 (5th Cir. 2008) (“When an 
organization is controlled by a group of competitors, it is considered to be a conspiracy of its 
members.”); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 728 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that 
“[p]rofessional associations are ‘routinely treated as continuing conspiracies of their members’” 
(quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988))); Kreuzer 
v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that there was 
“no doubt that a conspiracy existed within” a professional association that enforced rules 
regarding requirements for “active membership” in the association); In re Cal. Dental Ass’n, 
121 F.T.C. 190, 292 (1996) (“[P]rofessional associations are routinely treated as continuing 
conspiracies of their members.”).  
 212. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 213. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n 
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 464 (1986); Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31 
(1984); Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 699 (1978).  
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its effect, actual or probable.”214 In short, under the antitrust rule of 
reason, courts evaluate whether the procompetitive effects of the 
action outweigh the anticompetitive effects. As demonstrated below, 
a state ethics committee’s collective ban on reasonable covenants not 
to compete in the context of in-house counsel is inherently 
anticompetitive. 
1. Reasonable Noncompete Agreements are Actually 
Procompetitive.  The plain language of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
prohibits “every” contract that restrains trade.215 Because such a 
literal reading of the statute “would outlaw the entire body of private 
contract law,”216 and because Congress “expected the courts to give 
shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law 
tradition,”217 courts have “long held that certain ‘ancillary’ restraints 
of trade may be defended as reasonable.”218 
Specifically, under antitrust analysis “covenants not to compete 
in a particular business, for a certain period of time, within a defined 
geographical area, ha[ve] always been considered reasonable when 
necessary to carry out otherwise procompetitive contracts.”219 Courts 
consistently explain that they uphold such covenants because it is 
“necessary for people to cooperate in some respects before they 
compete in others, and cooperation facilitates efficient production.”220 
In short, although perhaps semantically counterintuitive, reasonable 
noncompetes effectuate a procompetitive result in the marketplace. 
 
 214. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238. 
 215. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides, “Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” Id.  
 216. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
531 (1983) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 687–88). 
 217. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 687–88.  
 218. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 737 (1988) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
 219. Id. 
 220. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Antitrust law is 
designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all 
economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment.”); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (noting that in some industries, “horizontal restraints on 
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all”); Major League Baseball Props., 
Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 338 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting the “efficiency-enhancing” purpose 
of reasonable restrictive covenants); Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 
1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(same). 
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A commonplace demonstration of the hiring process illustrates 
the procompetitive effect of restrictive covenants: A hires B as a 
salesman. B signs a reciprocal covenant not to compete, and A then 
passes valuable customer lists to B. “At the time A and B strike their 
bargain, the enterprise (viewed as a whole) expands output and 
competition by putting B to work. The covenant not to compete 
means that A may trust B with broader responsibilities, the better to 
compete against third parties.”221 
This procompetitive aspect of noncompete covenants is of 
paramount importance. It is undoubtedly true that once employment 
ends, nothing is left but the restraint—“but the aftermath is the wrong 
focus.”222 As Judge Frank Easterbrook has explained, “A legal rule 
that enforces covenants not to compete, even after an employee has 
launched his own firm, makes it easier for people to cooperate 
productively in the first place.”223 Under such a regime, an employer, 
“[k]nowing that he is not cutting his throat by doing so . . . will train 
the employee, giving him skills, knowledge, and trade secrets that 
make the firm more productive.”224 
2. The Bar Associations’ Per Se Ban on Reasonable Noncompetes 
Is Inherently Unreasonable.  Prior to the 1960s, restrictive covenants 
for attorneys, like all other professionals, were governed on a case-
specific basis under the common-law reasonableness test.225 The 
antitrust “rule-of-reason” test mirrors the common-law 
reasonableness test discussed above.226 It follows, therefore, that the 
 
 221. Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189 (emphasis added). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. (emphasis added).  
 224. Id. To be clear, the procompetitive aspects of covenants not to compete not only 
benefit the employer and the employee but also benefit the public at large. Judge (later Chief 
Justice and President) Taft, in the premier antitrust case in U.S. history, explained that 
“[c]ontracts for the partial restraint of trade are upheld, not because they are advantageous to 
the individual with whom the contract is made . . . but because it is for the benefit of the public 
at large that they should be enforced.” United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 
281 (6th Cir. 1898) (quoting Mallan v. May, 11 Mees. & W. 652, 665–66 (1843)). Judge Taft 
agreed with the reasoning of an earlier decision, which stated that “the public derives an 
advantage in the unrestrained choice which such a stipulation gives to the employer of able 
assistants, and the security it affords that the master will not withhold from the servant 
instruction and experience.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 225. See supra Part I.  
 226. See, e.g., Baker’s Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 730 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (E.D.N.Y. 
1990) (finding that a reasonable covenant does not violate the Sherman Act); Carvel Corp. v. 
Eisenberg, 692 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining that covenants should be analyzed 
for antitrust purposes under the rule of reason); R.W. Intern., Inc. v. Borden Interamerica, Inc., 
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per se ban on attorney noncompete agreements raises a serious 
antitrust issue. The per se ban, after all, precludes even reasonable 
attorney noncompete agreements, which are enforced only if they are 
procompetitive, efficiency enhancing, and in the public interest.227 By 
establishing a per se ban, the bar committees have effectively 
eliminated a legal regime that allows people “to cooperate [more] 
productively in the first place,”228 and to form contracts that 
“benefit . . . the public at large.”229 
As Parts I–III explain, public-interest justifications do not 
warrant prohibiting all noncompete agreements involving in-house 
counsel.230 The per se prohibition is particularly egregious in light of 
the fact that the common-law reasonableness test provides the 
analytical flexibility to strike down a specific covenant at a more 
informed stage on the basis of public interest. And where other 
professionals (like doctors) have advocated for a per se ban against 
covenants not to compete on the basis of “public interest,” courts 
have consistently rejected these requests—calling a per se rule “self-
serving” and recognizing the harm that could result to patients under 
such an approach.231 Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has dismissed 
these self-serving “quality-of-care” arguments, making clear that 
professional associations have no excuse to masquerade 
anticompetitive policies as ethical rules.232 
 
673 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D.P.R. 1987) (noting that covenants not to compete are analyzed under 
the rule of reason); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Corp., 500 F. Supp. 332, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1980) 
(holding that a covenant not to compete was not an antitrust violation under the rule of reason); 
Vanguard Envtl., Inc. v. Curler, 190 P.3d 1158, 1169 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) (holding that a ten-
year restrictive covenant unlimited by geography was an unreasonable restraint of trade). 
 227. See supra note 220 (collecting cases); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 188 (1981) (considering injury to the public as part of the analysis for the rule of 
reason).  
 228. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 229. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 281.  
 230. The analysis in Part I, in particular, bolsters this by demonstrating that Rule 5.6’s policy 
justifications do not apply to in-house counsel.  
 231. Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass’n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 280–81 (Ind. 1983); see also 
Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 866 N.E.2d 85, 95 (Ill. 2006) (“[R]estrictive covenants 
can have a positive impact on patient care. We do not know, and are ill-equipped to determine, 
what the possible consequences might be if we were to adopt the sweeping changes plaintiffs 
advocate.”); id. (“It is possible that patients would be more adversely affected if we were to ban 
reasonable restrictive covenants in physician employment contracts.”); Cent. Ind. Podiatry, P.C. 
v. Krueger, 882 N.E.2d 723, 728 (Ind. 2008) (“Any decision to ban physician noncompetition 
agreements altogether should be left to the legislature.”).  
 232. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n 
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 464 (1986); Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31 
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By prohibiting reasonable covenants not to compete in order to 
protect the “professional autonomy”233 of lawyers, bar associations 
have placed the parochial, self-interested concerns of bar members 
over a balanced legal regime designed to protect competition and 
consumers. Such behavior is manifestly anticompetitive and likely in 
violation of the Sherman Act. 
B. Bar Associations Are Not Entitled to State-Action Immunity 
Under the Supreme Court’s Dental Board Standard 
The primary reason that ethics opinions, like New Jersey 
Opinion 708, have not been challenged under antitrust doctrine is 
that, for the last several decades, courts have assumed that challenges 
to state bar associations would fail under the state-action immunity 
doctrine.234 The core doctrine of state-action immunity holds that a 
“state’s own actions ‘ipso facto are exempt’ from the antitrust laws.”235 
In other words, the state has the power to restrict trade, grant 
monopolies, and authorize business combinations that otherwise 
would be illegal under federal law. For example, legal ethics rules are 
immune from antitrust liability because they are promulgated by the 
state supreme court (not the bar association) and, therefore, are an 
exercise of the state’s sovereign power.236 However, legal ethics 
opinions adopted by state bar associations, rather than courts, are not 
subject to the same blanket immunity. In fact, the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected this contention in Goldfarb v. Virginia State 
Bar,237 in which it held a state bar association liable under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act: “[T]hat the State Bar is a state agency for 
 
(1984); Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 699 (1978); see also Am. Med. 
Ass’n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (“[T]he fact that the conspiracy may 
be intended to promote the public welfare . . . is [not] sufficient to avoid the penalties of the 
Sherman Act.”). 
 233. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 234. See Munneke, supra note 204, at 587–88 (discussing the FTC’s reluctance to pursue 
antitrust actions against ethics opinions of state bar associations). 
 235. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis 
added). 
 236. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977) (“[When] the challenged 
restraint is the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court . . . the ultimate body 
wielding the State’s power over the practice of law . . . restraint is ‘compelled by direction of the 
State acting as a sovereign.’” (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 41 U.S. 773, 791 (1975))). 
 237. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 41 U.S. 773 (1975). 
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some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows 
it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.”238 
Although that decision in its own right would suggest that all 
behavior of bar associations would be susceptible to antitrust attack, 
subsequent case law has not provided a consistent or clear framework 
to determine when bar associations (or other similar state agencies) 
are susceptible to antitrust liability.239 
Supreme Court precedent holds that a “private actor” can be 
immune from the antitrust laws under the state-action-immunity 
doctrine only if the challenged restraint is (1) “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed as state policy” and (2) “actively supervised” 
by the state itself.240 It was generally accepted that a state bar’s action 
would, at a minimum, need to be “clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed as state policy” to be immune under the state-
action doctrine.241 Prior to the Dental Board case, however, it was also 
almost unanimously believed that bar associations would not have to 
meet the “active state supervision” prong to secure immunity.242 As 
such, state ethics committees, operated by market participants who 
are elected by other market participants, regularly issue ethics 
opinions and conclude, without judicial oversight, that in-house 
attorneys may not sign covenants not to compete.243 
Dental Board explicitly rejected this assumption and held that “a 
state board on which a controlling number of decisionmakers are 
active market participants in the occupation the board regulates must 
satisfy Midcal’s active supervision requirement in order to invoke 
 
 238. Id. at 791. 
 239. Munneke, supra note 204, at 594.  
 240. Id. at 593 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 
(1978)). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Supreme Court: State Agencies Controlled by Active Market Participants Must Have 
Active State Supervision to Qualify for Antitrust Immunity, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Mar. 
2, 2015), http://www.mwe.com/Supreme-Court-State-Agencies-Controlled-by-Active-Market-
Participants-Must-Have-Active-State-Supervision-to-Qualify-for-Antitrust-Immunity-03-02-
2015 [http://perma.cc/X8F9-E9MH]; see also Munneke, supra note 204, at 594 (“[T]he state may 
avoid such a conflict by either formulating standards and administering procedures or 
delegating the job to private parties, in which case the policies displacing competition must be 
clearly and affirmatively expressed and appropriately supervised.”). 
 243. See id. at 594 n.219 (“Although procedures vary from state to state, state supreme 
courts, in practice, are seldom active participants in overseeing anticompetitive policy. Rather, 
they oversee the disciplinary process as a whole.”). 
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state-action antitrust immunity.”244 The Court sensibly explained that 
“[w]hen a State empowers a group of active market participants to 
decide who can participate in its market, and on what terms, the need 
for supervision is manifest.”245 As such, “[t]he similarities between 
agencies controlled by active market participants and private trade 
associations are not eliminated simply because the former are given a 
formal designation by the State.”246 
In the future, state bar associations can adjust their 
organizational structures and their relationships with the state 
supreme courts to help ensure that they meet this new criteria for 
active state supervision. However, many state bar associations have 
almost certainly lacked adequate supervision. In amici filings in 
Dental Board, the state bar associations themselves acknowledged 
that “[m]any state legislatures have chosen to regulate the legal 
profession through agencies composed of lawyers elected by their 
peers” (the precise definition of a private market participant under 
the Fourth Circuit’s test), and conceded that “[i]f the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision stands, those state bars will face Sherman Act liability.”247 
Given the clearly anticompetitive effect of the extension of the 
per se ban to in-house attorneys, and the absence of active state 
supervision, state ethics commissions are vulnerable to antitrust 
lawsuits. 
CONCLUSION 
The existing per se ban on noncompete agreements in the legal 
profession is hard to reconcile with the successful application of the 
common-law reasonableness test for every other profession. In fact, 
no logical basis exists for imposing a flat prohibition on noncompete 
agreements in the legal context, rather than balancing the competing 
interests of employer, employee, and the public at large on a case-
specific basis. 
 
 244. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015) (referring to Cal. 
Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980)). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Brief of the North Carolina State Bar et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
6, 17, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-154) (essentially 
conceding that state bar associations do not proceed under “active supervision” of the state 
itself).  
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However problematic the per se ban might be when applied to 
attorneys departing law firms, it is far more troubling when applied to 
in-house counsel. Indeed, the arguments typically advanced in the 
context of outside counsel—ranging from the special ethical 
obligations of law firms to the promotion of client choice in retaining 
existing legal representation—are inapposite to in-house counsel. By 
rubberstamping an already dubious per se ban in a context in which it 
has no plausible justification, courts and bar ethics committees harm 
employers and the public. The per se ban on reasonable noncompete 
agreements involving in-house counsel is anticompetitive, and bar 
ethics committees that continue to espouse that ban may risk antitrust 
liability. 
